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Reviews of American Sāmoa, Hawai‘i, 
Sāmoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Wallis and Futuna are not included in 
this issue.
Cook Islands
This review covers the two-year period 
from July 2016 to June 2018 and 
tracks a range of ongoing and emerg-
ing concerns. Featured here are the 
implications from the 2016 population 
census, Marae Moana (the national 
marine park), the Cook Islands’ 
impending Organisation for  Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(oecd) graduation to high-income 
country status, a controversial local 
tax amnesty, and events connected 
with the 2018 general election.
2016 saw the five-year national 
population survey get underway. 
Preliminary results of the 2016 cen-
sus, which was held on 1 December, 
recorded a total population of 17,459 
(mfem 2018c). Including residents 
and nonresidents (mostly tourists), 
the count shows a 2 percent decrease 
from the 2011 census (mfem 2018c). 
However, official reporting on popula-
tion trends was delayed, as technical 
problems with equipment meant that 
the data had to be sent to New Zea-
land for compilation. Nevertheless, it 
is expected that the census data will 
show a further population drop, espe-
cially on the Pa ‘enua (outer islands), 
where development economist Vaine 
Wichman pointed out that island lead-
ers and public health workers “have 
a fairly good handle on the ebb and 
inflow of people to the islands” (cin, 
1 June 2017), so are able to anticipate 
changes and demands for services and 
resources. However, eighteen months 
on, the official details of people’s 
mobility in and out of the country, 
economic activity, housing, and well-
being are still not available. On the 
face of it, it would seem that timely 
and informed public policymaking, 
planning, and service provisions will 
be impacted. But to some extent this 
is not necessarily a bad thing, because 
population-related policies need to 
be informed by more than just demo-
graphic trends, which invariably can 
be used to support the taken-for-
granted arguments typically associated 
with the vulnerabilities and question-
able viability of small island state 
development and economies (Baldac-
chino and Bertram 2009).
Depopulation is a national concern 
and a political football (cin, 31 May 
2018), especially given its implications 
for the country’s labor force and its 
ability to support the tourism indus-
try. However, it is important to also 
take account of the cultural and social 
imperatives that play a part in people’s 
mobility, aspirations, and experiences, 
which may help deepen understand-
ings when interpreting population 
patterns and trends. For example, the 
cost of living and the ability to earn 
a living wage were the main concerns 
of the 2018 Minimum Wage Rate 
Review Report (Government of the 
Cook Islands 2018). The review panel 
agreed that the Cook Islands Census 
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2016 and 2016 Household Income 
Expenditure Survey would serve as the 
analytical basis for setting the mini-
mum wage, along with a labor market 
assessment. However, in the absence 
of these major data sets, the panel 
concentrated on reviewing any major 
changes since the previous report in 
2017. The review panel considered 
that “the main employers of mini-
mum wage employees were the public 
sector, small businesses and the few 
businesses in the Pa Enua” (Govern-
ment of the Cook Islands 2018, 3). 
As such, island administrations were 
likely to respond to an increase in 
minimum wage by reducing the work 
hours of minimum wage staff, assum-
ing that there was no increase in the 
Pa ‘enua funding model to help meet 
the new rate (Government of the 
Cook Islands 2018, 4). So while their 
take home pay would not change, 
workers would have more time for 
other activities, including subsistence 
farming and fishing. Regardless, the 
cost of living remains relatively high 
due to the country’s small population, 
the reliance on imports to meet local 
consumption needs, and the distances 
that imported goods must travel, caus-
ing transport costs to affect the price 
of goods (Government of the Cook 
Islands 2018, 7).
Another aspect of the Cook Islands 
population to consider is the increas-
ing number of tourists to the Cook 
Islands. The environmental and social 
sustainability of the country is now 
being put to the test with record high 
numbers of tourists reaching over 
150,000 in 2017 (rnz 2017a). Titika-
veka Member of Parliament (mp) Sel 
Napa pointed out that “we should 
be safeguarding the very things that 
make us a place that tourists want 
to visit, cramming as many tourists 
on to Rarotonga isn’t the way to go” 
(rnz 2017b). Despite the launch of 
the Cook Islands Sustainable Tourism 
Development Framework and Goals in 
October 2016, which set some direc-
tion for attending to the numerous 
tourism issues, Napa contended that 
without upgrading existing infrastruc-
ture and utilities, such as the roads, 
water, power, and sewerage and waste 
disposal facilities, it would be difficult 
to sustain the increasing number of 
visitors. Furthermore, demands on 
human resources, public services, and 
accommodation capacity are increas-
ing, as are the impacts on the lagoon 
environment. Of these concerns, 
Prime Minister Henry Puna said, 
“our elders gave birth to this industry 
but clearly, the future is in the hands 
of those growing up within it” (cin, 
13 Oct 2017). In this regard, urgency 
is needed in meeting these demands, 
which may include making use of 
donor partners and aid.
Increasingly, ocean matters are of 
political and public concern. In July 
2017, the Marae Moana legislation 
to protect and conserve the Cook 
Islands’ marine environment came 
into effect. It established a multiple-
use marine park covering the county’s 
entire economic exclusion zone of 
1.9 million square kilometers (Burton 
2017). After five years of consultation 
and planning with island communities 
and various interest groups, Marae 
Moana is now governed by a national 
council, which is chaired by Prime 
Minister Puna. Current, related activi-
ties include undertaking marine spatial 
mapping, which is an important aspect 
of governing certain activities such as 
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fishing, seabed mining, ocean explora-
tion, and sustainable tourism activi-
ties. Marine protected areas around 
each island have been extended to 
fifty nautical miles, designating an 
area in which large-scale fishing and 
seabed mining activities are prohib-
ited (cin, 6 Feb 2018). As the world’s 
largest marine protected area, Marae 
Moana also contributes to the Pacific 
Oceanscape project, of which the 
Cook Islands is one signatory among 
twenty-three other Pacific Island states 
and territories.
As ocean custodians, the Cook 
Islands’ governance and protection 
of our waters is also a key part of 
the indigenous renaissance of the 
vaka moana (double-hulled voyaging 
canoe). The Cook Islands Voyag-
ing Society has drawn on traditional 
knowledge of vaka akonoanga (vaka 
culture) to campaign alongside other 
Oceanic peoples, calling for the envi-
ronmental protection of the ocean and 
speaking out against climate change, 
pollution, and unsustainable fishing 
operations.
 However, the Cook Islands Voyag-
ing Society suffered a setback when 
its vaka moana Marumaru Atua was 
damaged by fire in September 2017, 
requiring a complete rebuild (cin, 17 
Sept 2017). Funds toward the rebuild 
were offered from various local 
and overseas supporters, helping to 
establish the value of the Marumaru 
Atua as a learning institution of vaka 
culture and an icon of environmental 
sustainability. This was eventually 
recognized by the government; Cook 
Islands Minister of Finance Mark 
Brown announced a nz$255,000 
(nz$100,000 = us$65,227) con-
tribution toward the cost of the 
nz$320,000 rebuild, establishing the 
vaka’s status as a national treasure. 
The Cook Islands Voyaging Society 
aims to have “mama vaka” back in 
the water in 2019 to continue the 
legacy of traditional sailing and navi-
gation and ocean protection (cin, 3 
Feb 2018).
In response to being owed over 
nz$33 million of back taxes, in 2017 
the Cook Islands Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Management (mfem) 
put in place a tax amnesty. For a 
five-month period, all Cook Islands 
taxpayers were given an opportunity 
to clear tax debts or disclose evaded 
taxes without fear of prosecution. 
The amnesty allowed all additional 
taxes, such as late payment penalties 
and turnover taxes, to be written off 
(mfem 2017b).
News of the tax amnesty was part 
of Prime Minister Puna’s Christmas 
message to the nation in December 
2016. However, a law change was 
required because the law at the time 
only allowed a specific government 
official, designated as the Collector of 
Taxes, the power to make individual 
tax write-off decisions on a case-by-
case basis (cin, 12 Jan 2017). The 
move was supported by both sides 
of the House, and the amnesty got 
 underway in August 2017.
The amnesty was later extended to 
the end of March 2018. During that 
time, Minister of Finance Mark Brown 
announced that the government 
decided to write off all outstanding 
tax prior to 1 January 2010 as part 
of the amnesty. Worth nz$18 mil-
lion, the intention behind the amnesty 
was to ease the burden on people and 
businesses as well as to enable the tax 
office to focus on the nz$14 million 
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debt, which had been accruing since 
2010 (rci, 2 Feb 2018). This was 
welcome news for those employees 
and businesses with tax debts. Accord-
ing to public accountant Mike Carr, 
for those taxpayers who were up-to-
date or had cleared their tax debts, 
the news was less welcoming (cin, 19 
Feb 2018). This raised questions about 
the equity of law enforcement and the 
influence of politicians and business 
people on our tax administration (cin, 
19 Feb 2018).
An ongoing matter that reemerged 
during this period of review was the 
Cook Islands’ impending graduation 
to and reclassification as a developed 
country by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (oecd). Following the country’s 
continued strong economic growth 
(mfem 2017a), this reclassification 
would mean that the Cook Islands 
would also graduate to high-income 
status. This is a disincentive for oecd 
donor countries to provide conces-
sional loans and grants to the Cook 
Islands. Under the oecd’s Develop-
ment Advisory Committee (dac) 
rules, financial assistance from donor 
partners will not count toward the 
official development assistance (oda) 
target of 0.7 percent of gross domestic 
product (gdp).
In October 2017, the oecd con-
firmed the controversial graduation 
had been delayed due to insufficient 
supporting data. In his analysis of 
the possible implications of gradua-
tion, Dr Geoff Bertram argued that 
the oecd’s use of a country’s gross 
national income (gni) to determine 
their income status is problematic 
because it is something that small 
economies such as the Cook Islands 
do not calculate (Bertram 2016). 
Instead, the oecd was using gdp as a 
proxy to gni “to determine the gradu-
ation status, which is wrong,” said 
mfem Financial Secretary Garth Hen-
derson (cin, 2 Oct 2017). The oecd’s 
dac took the unusual step of granting 
the Cook Islands an extension to the 
end of 2018 to sort out its gni data. 
Whether or not graduation takes place 
sooner rather than later, successfully 
managing the reclassification to a 
high-income developed country will 
require transitional arrangements to 
be put in place, including restructur-
ing existing financial arrangements 
(Wyeth 2017).
To this end, restructuring such 
arrangements will likely include 
changes to taxation. Bertram offered 
some key considerations, such as 
raising the country’s company tax 
rate, which is currently low (Bertram 
2016, i). This is problematic because 
of self-imposed tax percentage thresh-
olds adopted as part of its financial 
management arrangements.
Furthermore, Bertram suggested 
that one way to “free up resources 
for the financially stressed education, 
health and social impact sectors” 
would be to stop or privatize the 
nz$12 million annual subsidy that the 
government pays to Air New Zealand 
(Bertram 2016, ii). Bertram argued 
that, should the subsidy continue, “a 
case can be made for having it paid for 
by the private tourism sector which 
is the direct beneficiary” (Bertram 
2016, ii). Bertram also identified 
“an unidentified outflow of up to 
[nz]$100 million per year from the 
economy, which “is likely the after-tax 
private-sector profits and land rents 
retained offshore rather than invested 
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back into the Cook Islands economy” 
(Bertram 2016, i). It would seem that 
Bertram’s suggestion of “capturing a 
greater share of this surplus” could 
be achieved by dropping the airline 
subsidy (Bertram 2016, i).
Related to the tax threshold 
mentioned earlier, Bertram proposed 
addressing the lingering effects of the 
Cook Islands’ “1998 austerity package 
agreed with its creditors New Zea-
land, Nauru, and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank” (Bertram 2018, 44). At 
a meeting in Manila in 1998, this 
“cold-turkey cure” (Bertram 2018, 
56) for the country’s fiscal excesses of 
the 1980s and 1990s involved impos-
ing fiscal measures “in exchange for 
the writing-off of half of its [the Cook 
Islands’] debt” (Bertram 2018, 57). 
These measures stipulated that “public 
sector wages and salaries should be 
capped at 44 per cent of total revenue, 
falling to 40 per cent over time; debt 
servicing should not exceed 5 per cent 
of total revenue; the overall budget 
deficit should not exceed 2 per cent of 
gdp; and net debt should not exceed 
35 per cent of gdp” (Bertram 2018, 
57). In addition, one fiscal measure 
considered the most “serious . . .  
draconian . . . .[and] straight from the 
hard core of the neoliberal austerity 
playbook” (Bertram 2018, 58–59) was 
that tax revenue should not exceed 
25 percent of gdp (Bertram 2018, 
57). What has resulted is a situa-
tion in which the shortfall in meet-
ing the costs of sustainable tourism 
infrastructure development over the 
medium-term is met through increas-
ing external aid, primarily because 
the fiscal ratios cap the government’s 
ability to raise revenue through taxa-
tion and borrowing. Thus, one of the 
challenges in the graduation transition 
will be to find ways to deal with the 
lingering effects of the twenty-year-old 
Manila agreement.
Continuing on the theme of the 
Cook Islands’ relationship with 
New Zealand, in March 2018 the 
Labour Party–led coalition govern-
ment arrived in the Cook Islands at 
the end of Prime Minister Jacinda 
Ardern’s Pacific tour. Prime Minister 
Ardern announced that changes would 
be made regarding Cook Island-
ers’ eligibility for the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund. Making good 
on its promises to amend existing 
entitlement restrictions, Cook Island-
ers who have worked in New Zealand 
for over twenty years will no longer 
have to reside in New Zealand for five 
years from the age of fifty to qualify 
for the New Zealand Superannua-
tion. This is considered good news, 
as it means that these individuals will 
be able to remain in the Cook Islands 
and continue to contribute to the local 
economy without further exacerbating 
existing demands on the labor force 
by leaving for a period of time (cin, 
14 March 2018; rnz 2018c).
The review period concluded with 
the 2018 general election, which was 
held on 14 June with approximately 
8,000 of 10,917 eligible people vot-
ing (mfem 2018b; rnz 2018d). The 
final count showed that the Demo-
cratic Party won 11 of the 24 seats, 
just one more seat than the Cook 
Islands Party’s (cip) 10 seats. The 
One Cook Islands Party won 1 seat, 
with 2 seats going to Independent 
candidates. However, despite not 
winning the majority of the votes, it 
was the cip that formed a majority 
government with the two Indepen-
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dents and One Cook Islands Party. 
This gave them a majority of 13–11. 
The offer of ministerial positions and 
a reshuffle of portfolios saw first-time 
candidate for Tongareva (Penrhyn) 
Robert  Tapaitau, Atiu candidate for 
the  Teenui-Mapumai constituency 
Vainetutai Rose Toki-Brown, and the 
One Cook Islands Party candidate 
and former Cook Islands Party mp for 
Tupapa-Maraerenga on Rarotonga 
George Maggie Angene form the Cook 
Islands Party–led government. Of 
course, the space for such offers came 
about when Rarotonga-based Teariki 
Heather, the minister for infrastruc-
ture, Kiriau Turepu, the minister for 
agriculture, and Minster for Health 
Nandi Glassie lost their seats on Elec-
tion Day.
A caretaker coalition government is 
now in place and awaiting the results 
of six petitions lodged following the 
election. It is expected that judicial 
decisions will be completed by Sep-
tember 2018. If successful, the Cook 
Islands Party–led government will 
 continue to govern for a third con-
secutive term. 
Despite winning the majority of 
votes in this election, the Democratic 
Party must surely be contemplating 
just what went wrong. For the second 
time in a row, they obtained more 
votes than the Cook Islands Party but 
failed to form a government. When 
Tina Browne, a prominent lawyer 
and Democratic Party leader, failed 
to cross the line to win the Raka-
hanga constituency, it must have been 
an outcome they could have done 
without, as it weakened their abil-
ity to negotiate a possible coalition 
arrangement.
All of the political parties touted 
electoral reform as an issue to be 
addressed if elected. Voter distribution 
and constituency size has long been a 
political conundrum, with neither of 
the two major parties making moves 
to revisit the twenty-four-seat con-
figuration while in power over the 
last twenty years. Apart from abol-
ishing the overseas seat and reduc-
ing the electoral term from five to 
four years, little else has happened. 
Prime Minister Puna confirmed that 
he would back moves for political 
reform if reelected for a third term 
(rnz 2018b). However, if his previous 
two terms are anything to go by, such 
moves seem unlikely without con-
certed public pressure.
Of note during this election were 
the ambitions, gains, and losses of the 
women candidates making up 12 of 
the 52 candidates. This is an increase 
of 5 from the 7 who stood in the 2014 
election (cin, 3 May 2018; mfem 
2018a). The Democratic Party loss of 
first-time candidate Tina Browne was 
certainly a blow after she had secured 
the confidence of the party to lead 
them into the election.
Despite Browne’s loss, Te-Hani 
Brown’s upset win over seasoned 
politician Norman George and cip 
incumbent Nandi Glassie can be seen 
as a significant flower in the young 
candidate’s ei katu (flower crown). 
Under the Democratic Party flag, 
she is at twenty-two years old set 
to become the youngest mp in the 
 country and region. Cook Islands 
Youth Council President Sieni Tiraa 
said “If anything, this shows a strong 
call for change . . . . most of all, 
we hope that Te-Hani will use this 
 position of responsibility to empower 
the rest of our young Cook Island-
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ers, and to stand for something new” 
(cin, 18 June 2018).
Brown and her mother Rose Toki-
Brown’s successful wins of both Atiu 
seats is also another first: a mother 
and daughter clean sweep. As reported 
in the last review (Newport 2017), 
Toki-Brown was originally elected as a 
cip candidate in 2014 before crossing 
the floor in 2016 to become the first 
female opposition leader.
However, in June 2017 she quit the 
opposition coalition when William 
“Smiley” Heather was confirmed as 
the Democratic Party’s leader. This 
saw Toki-Brown return to the cip 
camp to contest the 2018 election. 
Yet, the move was short-lived with 
Toki-Brown again jumping out of 
the cip vaka. She ran as an Indepen-
dent because she had been made to 
feel unwelcome and untrustworthy 
by the cip (cin, 15 June 2018). On 
winning her electorate, Toki-Brown 
subsequently rejoined the cip govern-
ment, this time as a cabinet minister 
responsible for health, justice, and 
agriculture (rnz 2018a). With mother 
and daughter now holding political 
power in Atiu, whether justified or 
not, all eyes will be watching to see 
if the  flip-flopping between parties 
continues.
Overall, the two years under review 
were the third and fourth year of the 
current government term. As such, the 
pressure has been on the government 
and political leaders to deliver on their 
promises and produce benefits for its 
citizens. Despite the political to-ing 
and fro-ing, it seems the Cook Islands 
Party–led government has managed to 
do enough to stay in power. However, 
with promises of political reform and 
tax increases a possibility, it remains 
to be seen just what changes will take 
place over the next twelve-month 
review period.
christina newport
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French Polynesia
The most important events during the 
year under review were the territorial 
elections of late April and early May 
2018, in which Édouard Fritch, after 
essentially ruling as a usurper for the 
last four years, was able to consolidate 
his power as the country’s new strong-
man by receiving a democratic man-
date. Besides the elections, the period 
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remained relatively calm and without 
major upheavals. While the tourism 
economy seems to be slowly recover-
ing, two controversial economic mega-
projects remain hotly debated. On the 
international level, French defiance 
of UN resolutions on the territory 
appears to continue unabated under 
the Macron administration.
The review period began with a 
new boost of international acknowl-
edgment for the country, and by 
extension the Pacific region at large, 
when on 9 July the Executive Council 
of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(unesco), at a meeting in Krakow, 
Poland, declared Marae Taputapuatea, 
a historical temple complex on the 
island of Raiatea, a World Heritage 
Site. For several years, cultural orga-
nizations on Raiatea as well as several 
local politicians had been campaign-
ing for the temple’s listing, and with 
their lobbying the nomination of the 
site slowly progressed. For the final 
decision, both the President of French 
Polynesia Édouard Fritch and the 
mayor of the Taputapuatea municipal-
ity on Raiatea, Thomas Moutame, 
traveled to Krakow to be present at 
the historic occasion (ti, 9 July 2017).
Marae Taputapuatea is an out-
standing example of Polynesian mega-
lithic architecture, with walls made 
out of coral stone slabs of a height 
of up to 3.5 meters each. The temple 
complex also has a regional impor-
tance that transcends today’s politi-
cal boundaries, as it was one of the 
most important spiritual and cultural 
centers of Eastern Polynesia during 
the centuries before European contact, 
with oral histories and temple names 
in other parts of French Polynesia, the 
Cook Islands, Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
and Hawai‘i referring to the site.
The inscription of Taputapuatea as 
a World Heritage Site marks what is 
so far the highest level of increasing 
institutional recognition of traditional 
Polynesian culture and spiritual-
ity. While Christian influence had 
for about two centuries obscured 
and denigrated many aspects of that 
culture, it is increasingly coming back 
in full force (Saura 2009). During 
the review period, one of the leading 
figures in the contemporary spiritual 
revival movement, Sunny Moanaura 
Walker—who unapologetically identi-
fies as a “pagan”—gained widespread 
recognition when a known local 
author published a biography about 
him (Ariirau 2017). 
A more problematic aspect of 
Taputapuatea’s world heritage list-
ing, however, is that as long as the 
country remains a French dependency, 
unesco considers France, not the 
country government, as the state party 
responsible for the site. In conse-
quence, Taputapuatea is now listed as 
a “French” heritage site on unesco’s 
website alongside such monuments 
as the Cathedral of Reims and the 
Palace of Versailles (unesco 2018), 
 reinforcing France’s colonial claim 
over the site rather than identifying it 
as a  pan-Polynesian monument.
Meanwhile, the country’s unre-
solved decolonization continued to 
be hotly debated within other UN 
agencies. During the annual hearings 
before the UN Decolonization Com-
mittee in New York at the beginning 
of October, the political status of 
French Polynesia was once again a 
subject of contention. President Fritch 
testified repeatedly that his country 
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was fulfilling all of the conditions of 
a self-governing country and should 
therefore be removed from the list of 
territories to be decolonized. However, 
since the country government actually 
only has administrative but no sover-
eign powers, which remain France’s 
exclusive prerogatives, the president 
earned little recognition. Accordingly, 
the Overseas Territories Review blog 
stated that Fritch’s statements were 
nothing more than “Colonial Accomo-
dationist Antics” (otr, 4 Oct 2017). 
The fifteen other representatives of 
French Polynesia who testified at the 
hearing all agreed and condemned 
their president and France’s refusal 
to cooperate with the UN decoloniza-
tion agencies (otr, 4 Oct 2017; rnz, 
6 Oct 2017).
In late November, this assessment 
received additional confirmation when 
the International Olympic Commit-
tee (ioc) in Lausanne, Switzerland, 
responded to a request for subsidies 
to the local Olympic Committee of 
French Polynesia. The ioc stated that, 
unless French Polynesia becomes an 
independent state, its local committee 
would not be recognized by Lausanne, 
and the country could only partici-
pate in international sporting events 
through affiliation with France’s ioc 
membership (ti, 30 Nov 2017). 
Similarly, most international experts 
agree that the premature granting of 
full membership in the Pacific Islands 
Forum (pif) to French Polynesia and 
New Caledonia in 2016 has essentially 
given France two seats in the pif, since 
foreign affairs is a French national 
prerogative, not one devolved to the 
country governments of either terri-
tory (Pareti 2017).
Any hopes that France’s new 
president, Emmanuel Macron, would 
finally bring a change in attitude from 
Paris were bitterly disappointed during 
the review period, as his administra-
tion’s actions made it clear that there 
would be no turn in France’s colonial 
policy.
Already Macron’s predecessor 
François Hollande had disappointed 
many Polynesians, as he had promised 
in writing before his election to sup-
port the decolonization of the country 
and then did the exact opposite. Many 
hoped that Macron, who had labeled 
France’s former colonial policy a 
“crime against humanity” during his 
election campaign, and who comes 
from a generation in which the decolo-
nization of most other French overseas 
territories had already been completed 
before he was born, would make a 
turnaround in this regard (Le Point, 
16 Feb 2017).
But in fact the Macron administra-
tion continued Hollande’s scandal-
ous disregard for international law 
as France was, for the fifth time in a 
row, reprimanded by the UN General 
Assembly for not transmitting infor-
mation on French Polynesia to the UN 
Decolonization Committee. In stark 
contrast to New Caledonia, where 
France has been dutifully cooperat-
ing with the United Nations for years, 
French Polynesia continues to be the 
only one of the seventeen UN-recog-
nized non-self-governing territories 
for which the administrative power is 
refusing to comply with article 71e of 
the UN charter by failing to forward 
information about the territory to 
the UN Decolonization Committee 
(United Nations 2017). Macron has 
thus turned out to be a hypocrite; 
under his leadership, France has 
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defended international legal instru-
ments such as the Paris Agreement 
against the rogue attitude of Donald 
Trump’s US administration, all while 
acting as a rogue state itself in regard 
to UN resolutions on decolonization.
Macron also continued the notori-
ous tradition of interference in French 
Polynesia’s domestic politics in favor 
of local pro-French forces when his 
party En Marche announced that it 
would officially support Édouard 
Fritch’s party, Tapura Huiraatira, 
in the upcoming territorial elections 
(Polynésie Première, 23 Feb 2018).
This official endorsement from 
Paris only served to reinforce the 
appeal of Tapura Huiraatira to both 
voters worried about financial subsi-
dies from France and local turncoat 
politicians looking to join whichever 
political party is in power. The party 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira—that of the 
doyen of local politics, eighty-seven-
year-old former President Gaston 
Flosse—which had won a two-thirds 
majority of seats in the last elections 
in 2013, and from which Tapura had 
split off in 2015, was reduced to a 
small minority in the process. Already 
in June 2017, the Speaker of the 
Assembly Marcel Tuihani Jr and his 
father, former Tahoeraa party trea-
surer Marcel Tuihani Sr, resigned their 
Tahoeraa membership and became 
Independents due to differences with 
Flosse (ti, 6 June 2017). In September, 
Tahoeraa assembly member Gilda 
Vaiho-Faatoa followed in Tuihani’s 
footsteps (dt, 4 Sept 2017). Just a few 
days later, Patricia Amaru and Juliette 
Nuupure also left Tahoeraa but, unlike 
the two Tuihanis mentioned above, 
went directly over to Tapura (rnz, 13 
Sept 2017). By the end of the term in 
April 2018, Tapura held a superma-
jority of 33 out of 57 assembly seats, 
while Flosse’s party retained only 12, 
with the rest consisting of 10 members 
for former president Oscar Temaru’s 
pro-independence Union pour la 
Démocratie (upld, which had also 
earlier lost a member to Tapura) and 
the two Independents Vaiho-Faatoa 
and Tuihani Jr, who by then had 
formed a new political party, Te Ora 
Api no Porinetia. 
In the run-up to the election, 
Temaru’s pro-independence camp was 
further weakened, as upld, formed in 
2004 as a larger umbrella organization 
including Temaru’s Tavini Huiraatira 
and several smaller pro-independence 
or left-wing autonomist parties, fell 
apart. Tauhiti Nena, a former minister 
of sports, culture, and youth under 
Temaru who had already run under 
his own party label in his unsuccessful 
bid for a seat in the French National 
Assembly earlier in 2017, formed 
a new coalition of splinter groups, 
named E Reo Manahune, which 
included his own party Tau Hoturau 
and the local Green party Heiura-Les 
Verts, a former upld component. 
Another former upld member party, 
Here Aia, joined Gaston Flosse’s 
Tahoeraa, and so did opportunistic 
former Mahina Mayor Emile Ver-
nau don (whose now defunct Aia Api 
party had also been a component of 
upld) and even two prominent vet-
eran Tavini members, Myron Mataoa 
and Tamara Bopp-Dupont (ti, 9 April, 
13 April 2018). This left Tavini to 
run as a single party, but at the same 
time the departure of opportunists 
and turncoats provided it with an 
opportunity to showcase its “moral 
purity”; the party pledged that none of 
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its candidates had ever been accused 
of political corruption and would 
immediately resign from politics if 
such a case should occur, whereas 
both Tahoeraa and Tapura included 
many candidates against whom cor-
ruption trials were pending, including 
President Fritch (ti, 17 Nov 2017). 
At the same time, Tavini modernized 
its political and economic platform, 
not advocating independence as a 
revolutionary rupture but rather as 
the eventual outcome of a sustained 
decolonization process in cooperation 
with France and UN agencies (Tavini 
Huiraatira 2018).
On the other hand, Tahoeraa was 
certainly benefiting from the several 
defections from the pro-independence 
camp. Joined by several prominent 
labor union leaders, Flosse’s new 
team gained the outlook of a party of 
nostalgics of an older political order—
a party that feared Fritch’s neoliberal 
reform program, much in line with 
that of Macron on the French national 
level. But Flosse’s campaign was ham-
pered by the fact that he himself was 
not allowed to run due to the condi-
tions of a suspended prison sentence 
for corruption. In consequence, his 
longtime confidant Geffry Salmon 
acted as Tahoeraa’s leading candidate 
instead, even though election posters 
still highlighted Flosse’s face, count-
ing on the veteran leader’s unabated 
charisma. Additionally, Tahoeraa 
denounced the current French govern-
ment as colonialist and advocated for 
a more substantial autonomy arrange-
ment with France, presenting a draft 
bill to make French Polynesia into 
an “associated country” of France, 
somewhat similar to the Cook Islands’ 
current relationship with New Zea-
land (Tahoeraa Huiraatira 2018b), a 
project attracting significant interest of 
voters with anticolonial and Tahitian 
nationalist convictions and thus pro-
viding competition to Tavini.
But despite sustained campaigns by 
both opposition parties, the election 
results were unequivocal in confirming 
Fritch’s political ascendancy. Already 
in the first round of voting on 22 
April, Tapura stood clearly ahead with 
43.04 percent of the vote. Tahoeraa 
scored second with 29.40 percent, 
while Tavini only won third place 
at 20.72 percent. Tuihani’s Te Ora 
Api o Porinetia gained 3.68 percent, 
while Nena’s E Reo Manahune scored 
merely 2 percent. Still further off with 
only 1.15 percent was another splin-
ter group: “Dignité Bonheur” led by 
French settler Jérôme Gasior, a local 
offshoot of the populist French party 
Union Populaire Républicaine (dt, 23 
April 2018).
In the runoff on 6 May, contested 
between those party lists that achieved 
at least 12.5 percent in the first round, 
Tapura won 49.18 percent, Tahoeraa 
27.72 percent, and Tavini 23.11 per-
cent. The outcome of the preliminary 
round was thus largely confirmed, 
with Tapura winning most of the first-
round votes of the splinter parties and 
Tavini also showing some slight gains. 
Voter turnout reached a historic low 
with only 61.51 percent in the first 
round and 66.82 percent in the second 
round (dt, 7 May 2018).
While the percentages alone created 
a clear majority, the allocation of seats 
in the state assembly was even more 
massively in favor of Tapura, since the 
electoral law grants the leading party 
list an automatic bonus of one-third 
of the seats beyond the proportional 
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distribution of the remaining two-
thirds of seats. Hence, Tapura received 
a two-thirds majority of 38 seats in 
the 57-seat assembly, while Tahoeraa 
got only 11 (down from 38 seats at 
the last election in 2013) and Tavini 
gained only 8 seats (11 in 2013).
On 17 May, the new assembly con-
vened for its inaugural meeting, and 
Tapura member Gaston Tong Sang 
(another former president of the coun-
try) was elected Speaker. Two days 
later, the assembly confirmed Fritch as 
president with a majority of 39 votes, 
while Salmon received 10 votes and 
Temaru 8 votes; one of the Tahoeraa 
members had already defected to 
Fritch’s camp. In his inaugural speech, 
Fritch expressed a conciliatory attitude 
toward the opposition and invited all 
assembly members to work together 
for the development of the country 
(ti, 17 May 2018).
Similar to the defection of Tong 
Sang from Tahoeraa in 2007 and 
his subsequent election victory in 
2008, the 2018 election results mark 
a new cycle in the country’s ever-
evolving political landscape. Just like 
Tong Sang, Fritch has taken most 
of the convinced pro-French forces 
within Tahoeraa with him, leaving 
Flosse himself and his hard core to 
move once more in the direction of 
independence. Tapura’s votes hence 
account for almost the entire French 
settler population (estimated at 10–15 
percent of total inhabitants) and all 
those locals who are concerned about 
a stable and secure flow of subsidies 
from Paris. But it remains an open 
question whether Fritch’s party, with 
such pure pragmatism and lacking a 
long-term vision, will have a future 
beyond the current term. Similarly, it 
is questionable whether Tahoeraa will 
maintain itself beyond the life of the 
charismatic “old lion” Flosse.
Temaru’s Tavini clearly also suf-
fered a massive electoral decline, not 
only because of the collapse of upld 
and defections to Tahoeraa but also 
because many voters see Temaru’s 
presidencies in the mid-2000s as a 
great disappointment, since nothing 
concrete was done at that time to pre-
pare for independence. Nevertheless, 
Temaru and his advisors have learned 
from many of their past mistakes and 
were careful not to succumb, as they 
did in 2008, to Flosse’s anticolonial 
rhetoric and to form a coalition with 
the “old lion.” Flosse’s proposal to 
form a common list of Tahoeraa and 
Tavini for the second round of the 
election, in order to be able to beat 
Fritch, was rejected by Tavini—an 
important step away from the tactics 
of power politics to moral integrity. As 
the only party with a clear long-term 
vision for the future, Tavini is clearly 
the party with the best chances of 
 survival beyond the life of its founder.
Meanwhile, it cannot be denied 
that Fritch’s prudent, pragmatic, 
and technocratic style of governance 
has yielded some positive economic 
results. Tourism, currently the only 
substantial industry in the private 
sector, has slowly picked up  traction 
again as the number of visitors 
increased to 198,959 in 2017 (ti, 16 
May 2018). But this is still less than 
at the height of the tourism boom in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, when there 
were far over 200,000 annual visitors 
(ispf 2002).
Increasing tourism in order to 
stimulate economic growth and over-
come dependency from French sub-
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sidies is the main motivation behind 
“Mahana Beach,” Gaston Flosse’s 
pet project envisioned during his last 
term in office from 2013 to 2014; it 
entails building a large resort area in 
Punaauia on Tahiti’s northwest coast, 
which would consist of various hotels 
(some of them high-rise) and shopping 
and entertainment facilities, akin to 
Waikīkī on O‘ahu, Hawai‘i, or Tumon 
on Guam. While the Fritch adminis-
tration continues to support the 
project, it has been less enthusiastic 
than Flosse, who kept promoting it on 
the title page of Tahoeraa’s electoral 
program. The project remains contro-
versial because of its potential envi-
ronmental impact, the massive injec-
tion of foreign (most likely Chinese) 
capital needed to build the facilities, 
and the planned exemption of the con-
struction site from the minimum wage 
and other social benefits for workers 
in order to make it attractive for those 
investors (Rival 2017: 340–341).
The second controversial economic 
“megaproject”—significantly more 
advanced in its planning than Mahana 
Beach—is the fish farm that is being 
built, also with Chinese capital, on 
the atoll of Hao in the Tuamotus. 
Praised as a “blue economy” project 
that would provide a new type of 
income for the country besides French 
subsidies and tourism, the project is 
also controversial because of envi-
ronmental concerns. First, the raising 
of thousands of fish in basins filled 
with millions of liters of water might 
entail massive impacts on the ecosys-
tem of the atoll’s lagoon (Rival 2017: 
339–340). Second, the site of the farm, 
a former support base for French 
nuclear weapons testing on other 
nearby atolls, is already significantly 
polluted both chemically and radio-
actively, leading to concerns about 
the quality of the fish produced at the 
facility (tpm, 17 May 2018).
Reflecting on both megaprojects, 
French researcher Aurélie Bayen saw 
a pattern of French Polynesian elites 
searching for new sources of finan-
cial support for their unsustainable 
levels of consumption, analogous to 
a “cargo cult” (Bayen 2017), with 
Chinese investments having sup-
planted the French military-industrial 
complex and its “manne nucléaire” 
(nuclear manna) during the period of 
nuclear testing from the 1960s to the 
1990s. Flosse’s new idea to finance 
the Mahana Beach project by an Arab 
billionaire from Abu Dhabi could 
be seen in that same logic (Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira 2018a).
While the country is still figuring 
out how to develop a self-sufficient 
and sustainable economy, the future 
of the French colonial presence in the 
region is far from clear, as French pol-
icy often seems to lack well-articulated 
long-term objectives (Regnault 2017). 
At the same time, the inhabitants of 
the Marquesas Islands, who have 
never really felt comfortable being 
part of a Tahiti-centered political 
entity, are still searching for a mean-
ingful status for their archipelago, 
either within or outside of the current 
political system (tpm, 20 April 2018). 
With the upcoming decolonization 
referendum in New Caledonia and its 
potential ramifications for Wallis and 
Futuna (Maclellan and Regan 2018: 1, 
19), ripple effects toward the French-
affiliated islands further east are not 
impossible in the near future.
During the review period, the 
country lost several leaders in the 
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political arena. On 29 August, former 
Papeete Mayor Louise Carlson (in 
office 1993–1995 and the only woman 
so far) passed away at age eighty-
seven (ti, 30 Aug 2017). Another local 
politician, former Moorea Mayor 
Teriitepaiatua Maihi, died on 24 Octo-
ber aged only sixty-three (ti, 24 Oct 
2017). On 20 February, seventy-
six- year-old businessman, Catholic 
church administrator, and politician 
Emmanuel Porlier, who was also a 
former assembly member, passed 
away in Paris (ti, 20 Feb 2018). Two 
days later, former assembly member 
for the Tuamotus and government 
minister Moehau Teriitahi, one of 
the “turncoats” who had been part 
of virtually every assembly majority 
during the political instability of the 
mid-2000s, died aged sixty-seven (ti, 
22 Feb 2018). On 6 April, leader of 
the labor union O Oe To Oe Rima and 
longtime assembly member Ronald 
Terorotua, another turncoat politician 
instrumental in making and unmaking 
 majorities, also passed away prema-
turely at age sixty-three (tntv,  
7 April 2018).
In the cultural realm, three person-
alities passed away at rather young 
age, including popular radio and tv 
journalist, composer, and comedian 
Mario Brothers on 2 December at 
age fifty-five (ti, 2 Dec 2017) and 
Wilson Mahuta, a musician, author-
ity on traditional percussion, and 
jury member of the annual Heiva 
competition, on 4 January, also aged 
fifty-five (ti, 4 Jan 2018). Writer 
Patrick Araia Amaru, a novelist and 
playwright in the Tahitian language, 
joined the ancestors on 18 June at the 
age of sixty (tntv, 18 June 2018). 
In contrast, Taaria Walker, known as 
“Mama Pare”—an elder and  cultural 
authority of her home island of 
Rurutu, author of an autobiogra phy 
(Walker 1999), and mother of Moa-
naura Walker (mentioned above)—
lived to the age of eighty-seven at 
her passing on 2 February (ti, 2 Feb 
2018).
I acknowledge Oscar Temaru and 
Gaston Flosse for sharing their per-
spectives during informal meetings 
before and after the election. Tapura 
Huiraatira was unresponsive to my 
attempts at contacting the party.
lorenz gonschor
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Māori Issues
The 2017 general election delivered 
twenty-nine members of Parliament 
of Māori descent, twenty of whom 
are in government, with eight of 
those becoming ministers. Māori 
also featured in sporting successes, 
especially women’s rugby and men’s 
softball. At the same time, racism 
against Māori became more blatant as 
decisions to allow Māori to have their 
own representation in local govern-
ment were all successfully overturned. 
Māori continue to be dispropor-
tionately impacted by the effects of 
poverty in stark contrast to the Pākehā 
(European) population, which enjoys 
relative affluence. That drew criticism 
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yet again from two United Nations 
treaty bodies as Māori continue to be 
denied our rights under both Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples. Since coming to power 
in late 2017, the new government has 
appeared to be more caring than the 
last, but little has changed for the large 
number of Māori struggling to survive 
in increasingly harsh socioeconomic 
conditions while still trying to protect 
our natural resources from overexploi-
tation. Before reviewing these issues, 
we will pause to remember a number 
of leaders we lost during this period, 
all of whom spent their lives fighting 
to achieve justice for Māori.
Ngāi Tahu of Te Waipounamu (the 
South Island) lost some well-loved and 
widely respected elders and leaders. 
Trevor Howse passed away in May 
2017. He helped organize and drive 
Ngāi Tahu’s treaty claim behind the 
scenes, collating a vast amount of the 
information that was presented to the 
Waitangi Tribunal. He was also part of 
the Ngāi Tahu team that spearheaded 
the negotiation process and resulted in 
one of the biggest treaty claims settle-
ments to date (Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu 2014). So too was Kuao Langs-
bury, who passed away in October. 
He first took a leadership role in Ngāi 
Tahu in 1961 when he was elected the 
chair of Ōtākou Rūnanga at the age 
of twenty-five (Waatea News 2017a). 
Then in January 2018 it was the gentle 
elder, leader, and Māori language, 
culture, and history teacher Kukupa 
Tirikātene. He provided advice and 
support for Ngāi Tahu’s leadership 
and contributed to the recovery of 
their dialect of the Māori language. 
Tirikātene came from a family of 
long-serving members of Parliament. 
His father, Sir Eruera, his sister, Whetū 
(Tirikātene-Sullivan), and his nephew, 
Te Rino, have all served as members of 
Parliament for the Southern Māori or 
Te Tai Tonga electorate (Waatea News 
2018b).
Artist, teacher, master carver, and 
heritage advocate Dr Cliff Whiting 
of Te Whānau a Apanui passed away 
in July 2017. He worked on a num-
ber of modern-day meetinghouses 
including the spectacular Te Hono ki 
Hawaiki on Rongomaraeroa Marae 
at the Museum of New Zealand Te 
Papa Tongarewa, Te Kupenga o Te 
Mātauranga at Palmerston North 
Teachers’ College, Maru Kaitatea on 
Takahanga Marae in Kaikoura, and 
Tahu Pōtiki on Te Rau Aroha Marae 
in Bluff. He also undertook large-scale 
murals for a number of government 
buildings including the New Zealand 
MetService, the National Library of 
New Zealand, and the Christchurch 
High Court (Hunt 2017).
Strong, outspoken, yet gentle Māori 
rights advocate Nuki Aldridge of 
Ngāpuhi passed away in November 
2017. His expertise and knowledge of 
northern history was legend, particu-
larly that relating to the formation of 
the collective of leaders, Te Whaka-
minenga o Ngā Hapū o Nu Tireni, 
who were responsible for the country’s 
first constitutional document, the 
1835 He Whakaputanga o te Rangati-
ratanga o Nu Tireni, or the declara-
tion of hapū (grouping of extended 
families) sovereignty often referred 
to in English as the Declaration of 
Independence. Nuki was a key witness 
in the hearings of the Waitangi Tribu-
nal on the mid-northern claims. The 
tribunal went on to issue in 2014 its 
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groundbreaking findings that Ngāpuhi 
did not cede sovereignty to the British 
when they signed Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
in 1840. New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements and parliamentary 
institutions have all been built on the 
false assumption that Māori had ceded 
sovereignty.
Ngāpuhi also lost another dedi-
cated Māori rights advocate, the 
highly respected broadcaster, Māori 
language expert, and Vietnam War 
veteran Kingi Taurua. He passed away 
in May 2018. Taurua was steeped in 
the history, traditions, and values of 
his ancestors and used his radio pro-
grams to bring them to the fore. His 
broadcasts of the discussions he held 
with other holders of such knowledge 
from around the country are greatly 
treasured. He was well known for 
challenging those he considered as 
not upholding the honor and integ-
rity of their ancestors, and he had 
little regard for those who bullied the 
people. His patience and calm consis-
tency often averted crises at Waitangi, 
especially during Waitangi Day com-
memorations.
Keita Walker of Ngāti Porou of the 
East Coast also passed away in May. 
She was a champion of Māori lan-
guage and culture. After a long career 
in education, she joined the Waitangi 
Tribunal in 1993. She also sat on 
many tribal and land boards on the 
east coast, including chairing Radio 
Ngati Porou (Waatea News 2018a).
Dr Koro Wetere of Ngāti Mania-
poto passed away in June. He was 
the Labour member of Parliament for 
Western Māori from 1969 until 1996 
and the minister of Māori Affairs from 
1984 until 1990. He extended the 
mandate of the Waitangi Tribunal so 
that it could hear claims dating back 
to 1840. He was a strong supporter 
of the Waikato-Tainui Kīngitanga and 
was influential in the 1995 settlement 
of Waikato’s Tiriti o Waitangi claims 
(E-tangata 2018).
We bade each of these leaders and 
many others farewell over the past 
year as they commenced their journey 
to join their ancestors.
The results of the 2017 General 
Election included the usual mixture of 
wins and losses for Māori. The Māori 
Party had the biggest loss; none of its 
members returned to Parliament. They 
had made too many concessions in 
order to sit on the government benches 
with their National Party coalition 
partner, denying the very Māori treaty 
and human rights they had been 
elected to defend. In the lead-up to the 
elections, the Māori Party’s minister 
of Māori Development had become 
increasingly embattled with his own 
constituents.
The election results indicated that 
no fewer than 29 members of Parlia-
ment of Māori descent are now in 
the House, spread across five parties: 
National, Labour, the Greens, New 
Zealand First, and act New Zealand. 
These members owe allegiance to their 
parties first, not to Māori. There are 
only 7 members (in a 120-seat Parlia-
ment) who are specifically mandated 
to represent Māori. However, even 
they must put their party’s wishes 
ahead of the needs of their constitu-
ents. All 7 Māori seats went to Labour 
and resulted in 8 Māori becoming 
ministers. Voter turnout of 67 percent 
in the Māori seats continued to be 
much lower than the overall turnout 
of 80 percent (Electoral Commission 
2018).
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The new prime minister, Jacinda 
Ardern, presented a softer, more car-
ing, and better-informed approach 
than that of previous governments 
when she visited Waitangi for the 
annual Waitangi Day commemora-
tions in February. She acknowledged 
the 1835 basis for New Zealand’s 
constitution, He Whakaputanga o 
te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, the 
Declaration of Māori Sovereignty. 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the 1840 treaty 
between Māori and the British Crown, 
is derived from the declaration. All 
previous governments, in keeping 
with their colonizing agenda, have 
eschewed the declaration because 
it threatens the legitimacy of their 
constitutional arrangements. The 
prime minister made commitments 
to lift Māori out of poverty, create 
more jobs, reduce the high incarcera-
tion and youth suicide rates of Māori, 
and ensure that Māori have adequate 
housing (tvnz 2018). Her comments 
followed on from Governor-General 
Patsy Reddy’s comments at the open-
ing of Parliament at the end of 2017 
when she pointed out, “No one should 
have to beg for their next meal. No 
child should be experiencing poverty. 
That kind of inequality is degrading 
to us all” (New Zealand Government 
2017). What Reddy did not mention 
was that it is Māori who dispropor-
tionately bear the burden of poverty 
in New Zealand and that the gap 
between Māori poverty and New Zea-
land European affluence is now a gulf. 
At the last count in 2015, the median 
wealth of New Zealand Europeans 
was nz$114,000, five times more than 
that of Māori at nz$23,000 (Stats NZ 
2016).
Achieving desperately needed 
improvement for Māori in all areas 
will not be straightforward. Some 
Pākehā who have derived great 
privilege and prosperity off the back 
of Māori poverty and deprivation 
are adamant that the status quo must 
be retained. They continue to fight 
to stop Māori recovering our rights 
and the resources they stole from us. 
None has been as blatantly racist as 
the group calling themselves Hobson’s 
Pledge, led by a past leader of the 
National Party. In 2017 and 2018, 
they successfully campaigned and 
overturned the decisions of five city 
and district councils to have Māori 
represented on their councils. They 
exploited discriminatory legislation 
that allows council decisions relating 
to Māori membership of councils (but 
not other types of membership) to be 
overturned by a referendum. To do so, 
Hobson’s Pledge used their extensive 
resources to organize large turnouts 
of their membership to vote against 
Māori becoming decision makers in 
local government (Hobson’s Pledge 
2017).
The Human Rights Commission 
received a number of complaints about 
the leaflets distributed by the group 
but was unable to take any action to 
prevent the behavior. The commission 
had earlier run a campaign against 
racism that was fronted by 2017 New 
Zealander of the Year and award-win-
ning filmmaker, actor, and comedian 
Taika Waititi (Mutu 2018a, 176). He 
has been talking for many years now 
about how racist New Zealand is. In 
April, Waititi was reported in an Eng-
lish magazine as saying that New Zea-
land is “racist as fuck” (Cafolla 2018). 
It went unreported by New Zealand 
media for four days until Waititi 
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himself goaded them into reacting by 
noting their silence in a Twitter post. 
Predictably, racist elements in Pākehā 
media attacked him mercilessly, prov-
ing Waititi’s point. But his message 
drew support from the race relations 
commissioner and the prime minister 
(Cafolla 2018), as well as from a num-
ber of other commentators.
Any hope that New Zealand might 
be moving away from its White 
supremacist foundations have been 
quickly squashed by the government’s 
deeply racist and divisive treaty claims 
settlement process (Mutu 2018a, 
178–180), which has continued to pit 
Māori against Māori over the past 
year. Divisions within Ngāpuhi, the 
country’s largest iwi (nation) over 
the mandate have continued and 
are reported on frequently by the 
media (Mutu 2018a, 178–179). Like 
Ngāpuhi, Whakatāohea of Te Moana 
a Toi (the eastern Bay of Plenty) and 
Ngāti Wai of Northland went to the 
Waitangi Tribunal over their disputes 
arising from the government’s man-
dating process. The tribunal found 
that for Whakatōhea there had been 
“a failure to fulfill the Crown’s duty 
to act reasonably, honourably, and in 
good faith” and recommended that 
there be a temporary halt to nego-
tiations until the issues identified 
in relation to the mandate could be 
addressed (Waitangi Tribunal 2018). 
For Ngāti Wai, they found that the 
body the Crown had recognized (the 
Ngātiwai Trust Board, which had been 
established to administer trust funds), 
was “not fit for purpose” to negotiate 
treaty settlements (Waitangi Tribunal 
2017). Meanwhile, tensions have been 
high between a collective of Hauraki 
iwi and neighboring Tauranga Moana 
iwi and Tāmaki Makaurau iwi after 
lands of the latter two were included 
in the settlement of the Hauraki iwi. 
Large numbers joined protest marches 
during 2017 and 2018 in an attempt 
to persuade the government to adhere 
to tikanga (Māori law), but they were 
largely ignored.
The new minister of Treaty of 
Waitangi negotiations indicated that 
he was prepared to discuss the prob-
lems associated with the treaty claims 
settlement policy with the National 
Iwi Chairs Forum. However, no dis-
cussions have eventuated. For nearly 
twenty-five years now, the policy 
has been controlled by government 
servants who have ensured adher-
ence to its original intent—an intent 
that was determined unilaterally by 
the government in the early 1990s 
but is not widely known or under-
stood (McDowell forthcoming; Mutu 
2018b). Recent research has focused 
on government documentation that 
spells out the aim of successive govern-
ments’ treaty claims settlement policy: 
it is not to “settle” claims but rather 
to remove Māori legal rights. That 
includes the legal rights won in the 
Court of Appeal in the 1980s to have 
governments relinquish lands that they 
stole and return control and owner-
ship of those lands to the Māori from 
whom they stole them. The policy 
also aims to remove our human rights 
as spelled out in Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
and in the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
particularly our right to self-deter-
mination (McDowell forthcoming; 
Mutu 2018b). Its overarching aim 
is to uphold the Doctrine of Discov-
ery in New Zealand, a doctrine that 
falsely asserts that Whites are inher-
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ently superior and therefore can take 
over the lands, lives, and resources of 
Indigenous peoples as and when they 
choose (Miller and others 2010; Mutu 
2018b). Government servants are 
striving to meet these goals by a dead-
line of 2020. During the period under 
review the government legislated the 
extinguishment of the claims of five 
claimant groupings: Ngāti Pūkenga 
of Tauranga, Rangitāne of Wairarapa 
and Tāmaki Nui-a-Rua, Ngāti Kahu 
ki Whangaroa of the Far North, Ngāti 
Kahungunu ki Heretaunga Tamatea 
of southern Hawke’s Bay, and Ngāi 
Tai ki Tāmaki of Auckland (Office of 
Treaty Settlements 2018).
The Doctrine of Discovery persists 
in the former British colonies of New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada, and 
the United States of America to this 
day (Miller and others 2010). It has 
resulted in numerous atrocities being 
perpetrated against Māori in the same 
or very similar ways that the other 
three states have abused and mis-
treated the Indigenous peoples in the 
territories that they took over. Since 
the 1970s, New Zealand’s persistence 
with this White supremacist approach 
has led Māori to call on the United 
Nations for support and assistance.
The United Nations has repeat-
edly criticized New Zealand for its 
treatment of Māori (Daes 1988; 
Stavenhagen 2006; Anaya 2011). 
During the period under review, two 
United Nations treaty bodies issued 
further criticisms and strongly worded 
recommendations for how to rem-
edy the New Zealand government’s 
unacceptable treatment of Māori. 
In August 2017, one of the recom-
mendations of the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion was that the government “issue, 
without delay, a timetable for debat-
ing, in partnership with Maori, . . .
the proposals contained in the report 
of Matike Mai Aotearoa” for con-
stitutional transformation (United 
Nations Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination. 2017; 
see also Jackson and Mutu 2016). 
Predictably, nothing happened. Then 
in March 2018, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
held an interactive dialogue with the 
New Zealand government as part 
of New Zealand’s periodic report-
ing. During the dialogue, committee 
members noted repeatedly that they 
were mystified that a developed and 
comparatively wealthy nation such as 
New Zealand has such appalling levels 
of socioeconomic deprivation, and 
especially among Māori. The com-
mittee’s report was released in May 
(United Nations Economic and Social 
Council 2018) and strengthened the 
recommendation of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion on constitutional transformation 
by recommending that the government 
“take immediate steps, in partnership 
with Māori representative institu-
tions, to implement . . . the proposals 
put forward in the 2016 Matike Mai 
Aotearoa report” (Jackson and Mutu 
2016). They also recommended that 
the government 
•  develop a national strategy to bring 
legislation and public policy in line 
with the provisions of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples;
•  put in place effective mechanisms to 
ensure meaningful participation of 
Māori in all decision-making pro-
cesses affecting their rights;
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•  take effective measures to ensure 
com pliance with the requirement of 
obtaining the free, prior, and informed 
consent of Indigenous peoples, nota-
bly in the context of extractive and 
development activities.
There were also strong recommenda-
tions regarding family violence and 
child abuse, and adequate resourc-
ing to address problems such as 
unemployment, poverty, housing and 
homelessness, health, and education as 
they impact Māori. A number of the 
recommendations reflected submis-
sions made to the committee by the 
National Iwi Chairs Forum’s Inde-
pendent Monitoring Mechanism. The 
mechanism has been working through 
this and other United Nations treaty 
bodies and the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
an attempt to shift the New Zealand 
government toward compliance with 
its international obligations regarding 
Māori.
Despite the worsening socio-
economic situation of most Māori, 
we have continued to fight against 
excessive and unsustainable exploi-
tation of our natural resources. 
Fresh water continues to pose major 
problems. Māori own the water but 
governments, including local govern-
ments, have usurped and then denied 
Māori ownership in order to retain 
the benefits for themselves. As a result, 
many rivers are now polluted and 
aquifers are coming under threat from 
freshwater bottling companies who 
pay nothing for the water they take 
and then sell overseas. In some rare 
cases, such as the Porotī springs in 
Northland, Māori have been legally 
recognized as the owners of water. But 
that has not stopped the local govern-
ment selling licenses to developers to 
take water that does not belong to 
them from the aquifer that supplies 
the springs for commercial bottling. 
The hapū (grouping of extended fami-
lies) of Porotī have been reduced to 
protesting in the streets, most recently 
in September 2017, in order to stop 
their water being stolen and their 
springs being damaged (Radio New 
Zealand 2017).
Water-bottling consents are now a 
pressing issue not only at Porotī but 
also in Whakatāne, with Ngāti Awa 
appealing against resource consents 
that would allow a company to take 
water for bottling (More 2018). The 
Waikato Regional Council put on 
hold an application to take water for 
bottling from the Blue Springs near 
Putaruru after an objection from the 
Raukawa Settlement Trust (Waatea 
News 2017b). Ngāti Tama at the 
top of the South Island are continu-
ing to pursue a water conservation 
order for their Waiporopupū springs 
after  successfully appealing a consent 
to take water for bottling in 2017 
 (Hindmarsh 2018). Underlying the 
objections of Māori owners is the 
 government’s ongoing refusal to 
address the fact that Māori own the 
water, despite promises made to the 
Supreme Court in 2013 that it would 
do so.
In other areas of resource man-
agement, consents for sand mining 
in south Taranaki are awaiting the 
decision of the High Court on appeals 
from Ngāti Ruanui, Ngā Rauru, and 
various other groups (Stowell 2018). 
The members of a marae (communal 
meeting complex) in Northland are 
fighting to stop the largest poultry 
factory farm in the country being 
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built next to their cemetery (Earley 
and Lambly 2018). Hapū members 
from Ihumātao near Auckland airport 
drew support from the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination in their fight to 
stop a housing development on their 
sacred stone fields (United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination 2017). And 
Ngāti Kahungunu of Hawke’s Bay 
led a protest against a consent issued 
without their knowledge for a walking 
track that has scarred the face of their 
sacred Te Mata o Rongokako range 
(Treacher 2018).
On a brighter note, we were proud 
to celebrate the performance of our 
Black Ferns Women’s Rugby team 
as they won not only the Women’s 
Rugby World Cup in Ireland in August 
2017 but also the Rugby World Cup 
Sevens–Women’s Tournament held in 
San Francisco in July 2018 (Rugby 
World Cup Women’s 2017; Rugby 
World Cup Sevens 2018). Almost all 
of the team are either Māori or Pacific 
Islanders. Likewise, our national 
softball team, the Black Sox, won their 
seventh world title in the Men’s World 
Softball Championship in Canada 
in July 2017. They are one of New 
 Zealand’s most successful sporting 
teams (Smith 2017).
margaret mutu
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Niue
Niue’s political scene has been marked 
by several significant events and activi-
ties over the past year. Most notably, 
Niue Premier Sir Toke Talagi secured 
a fourth term in government follow-
ing elections in May 2017, despite 
coming in third in common roll polls 
behind former member of Parliament 
(mp) and Niue High Commissioner to 
New Zealand O’Love Tauveve Jacob-
sen and long-serving common roll mp 
Terry Coe.
The postelection atmosphere 
quietly echoed the determination of 
those who were looking for a change 
in government and working to chal-
lenge an administration whose politics 
were dominated by a generation of 
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career politicians. Other emerging 
themes from Sir Toke Talagi’s govern-
ment included reaffirming its posi-
tion and preferences in regards to its 
free- association relationship with New 
Zealand, capacity building and sus-
tainable resource management for the 
island, an increase in activities related 
to Niue’s international relationships, 
and questionable amendments to 
legislation.
In August 2017, the legislative 
assembly passed a budget deficit 
of nz$1.1million (nz$100,000 = 
us$65,227) for the fiscal year 2017–
2018 (Takelesi 2017). This shortfall 
in the annual budget was met with 
great concern and many questioned 
the government’s management of its 
finances in relation to its ability to 
achieve its objectives, projects, and 
election promises. In January 2014, 
Niue’s Public Service was reduced to 
a four-day workweek, with public 
servants continuing to be paid for 
five full working days. However, this 
scheme does not apply to some public 
servants, such as teachers. Public 
servants had sought pay increases for 
a long time but were instead met with 
this scheme, with decreased productiv-
ity within the public sector often cited 
as a contributing factor to the deficit 
in the government’s budget (rnz 
2017). This is relatively concerning for 
a small island nation whose budget 
is predominantly made up of various 
sources of revenue from internal fees 
and tax measures and administrative 
assistance from New Zealand. Tax 
increases throughout the 2017–2018 
year were also met with mixed 
reviews, with these increases often 
cited by critics as being part of a plan 
to generate more revenue to relieve 
the budget deficit. An increase in 
departure tax from nz$34 to nz$80 
and increases in fuel prices and prices 
for tobacco products are examples of 
this (bcn, 4 July 2017). In his budget 
statement for the 2018–2019 fiscal 
year, the premier made a statement 
on working toward delivering a more 
“fiscally prudent balanced budget” 
(Office of the Premier of Niue 2018b). 
However, economic opportunities in 
Niue for achieving self-sufficiency 
and development going forward 
remain stagnant, and we can there-
fore anticipate the types of controls, 
adjustments, and changes that will be 
implemented to achieve the premier’s 
goals.
In October, celebrations in honor 
of forty-three years of self-government 
were commemorated locally with for-
eign dignitaries in attendance. Here, 
the premier emphasized the changes 
that Niue had experienced since 1974, 
and its wishes to work alongside New 
Zealand going forward, as opposed to 
the dominant-subservient or donor-
recipient relationship that the two 
have experienced at times (bcn, 24 
Oct 2017). The Niue Constitution Act 
1974 states that Niue is to be self-gov-
erning, with the New Zealand govern-
ment assisting in the management of 
its external affairs and defense (Par-
liamentary Counsel Office 1988a)—a 
relationship that should entail peaceful 
and positive cooperation. Over time, 
the budget support, aid, and develop-
ment assistance provided by the New 
Zealand government has resulted in a 
dominant-subservient type of relation-
ship, and the premier criticized New 
Zealand officials for their dominant 
behavior with respect to Niue’s inter-
nal affairs.
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In November 2017, the govern-
ment was faced with its first vote of 
no confidence since taking office, as 
submitted by opposition mp Terry 
Coe (bcn, 7 Nov 2017). The motion 
was put forward due to dissatisfaction 
with the government’s management 
of its finances, as well as the pre-
mier’s notable absence from assembly 
meetings as a result of lengthy peri-
ods of time spent overseas due to ill 
health. The premier’s absence during 
the assembly meetings in which the 
motion was submitted and addressed, 
along with one other minister who 
was away overseas, meant that two 
members assisting ministers (mams) 
were given an acting ministerial role 
to address the vote. In Niue, each of 
the four cabinet ministers has an mp 
whose role is to assist them in their 
duties. In February 2018, a fourth 
mam was sworn in, increasing the 
number of people in the cabinet to 
eight (bcn, 5 Feb 2018). 
In the Niue Assembly and in accor-
dance with article 6(1)(b) of the Niue 
Constitution Act 1974, “Any 4 or 
more members of the Assembly who 
are not Ministers may give notice of 
their intention to move a vote of no 
confidence in the Cabinet” (Parlia-
mentary Counsel Office 1988b). The 
vote of no confidence was addressed 
and defeated by a clear majority of 
twelve votes against four (bcn, 14 
Nov 2017). The assembly engaged 
in lengthy discussions on a variety of 
topics and, despite the unsuccessful 
bid, mp Terry Coe highlighted that 
this vote was a good opportunity and 
another way for members to get their 
position across to the government, as 
well as members of the public.
This identified a relatively grey area 
in the Niue Constitution (see article 
22 [1]), in which assembly meetings 
are not held on a regular basis but are 
to be held once every six weeks, with 
the Speaker, acting on request of the 
premier, maintaining authority and 
the power to call each meeting (Parlia-
mentary Counsel Office 1988c). mps’ 
opposition to the government’s use of 
the vote of no confidence to engage 
with the government raises questions 
on the frequency of assembly meet-
ings and the democratic nature of the 
management of legislative affairs by 
the premier and his cabinet. In a small 
island nation in which the notion of 
party politics would not be viable, 
the intricacies of managing govern-
ment versus opposition politics can be 
complex and, in this instance, there 
appears to have been limited engage-
ment with opposition members and 
perhaps the majority of members who 
are not directly part of the cabinet. 
This therefore raises questions regard-
ing the capacity that members in the 
assembly have in keeping the premier 
and his cabinet accountable, and what 
the role and limitations of the consti-
tution are in this.
Following the vote of no confi-
dence, an amendment to the Civil 
List Act was heavily debated in the 
assembly prior to being passed. This 
amendment to the Civil List Act 
saw increases in clothing allowances 
for mps. Payable once inducted, the 
clothing allowance for the premier 
has increased from nz$800 (2016) 
to nz$5000, for cabinet ministers 
from nz$750 to nz$4000, and for 
remaining mps, including the speaker, 
from nz$500 to nz$4000 (bcn, 
3 Oct 2017). Questions were raised 
on whether it is a conflict of interest 
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for members to make and pass such 
changes, as unlike countries such as 
New Zealand, Niue has no indepen-
dent body or review board for mps’ 
salaries and allowances. Pursuant to 
article 25 of the constitution, the Niue 
Public Service Commission, which is 
Niue’s employment authority, makes 
recommendations to the  assembly 
on the remuneration and other 
entitlements of the premier, ministers, 
Speaker, and other members (Parlia-
mentary Counsel Office 1988d). As 
these are merely described as “recom-
mendations,” it is not made clear in 
the constitution, or anywhere, who 
has the final authority and decision 
on such matters. This therefore raises 
further questions on how the entitle-
ments of members of the assembly are 
measured and determined using vari-
ous factors, such as members’ duties 
and responsibilities and the appropri-
ate remuneration for those within the 
public service.
Niue’s politics were not without 
its moments, including one in which 
it received international media atten-
tion following an altercation between 
a member and a cabinet minister after 
an assembly meeting. mp Terry Coe 
alleged that Minister for Ministry of 
Social Services Billy Talagi assaulted 
him following a heated debate inside 
the debating chamber (bcn, 6 Feb 
2018). After initially denying these 
allegations, the minister was dis-
charged without conviction after 
pleading guilty to assaulting the mp. 
This is a very rare occurrence within 
Niue’s political scene, but it certainly 
gained media coverage locally and 
overseas (rnz 2018a; Fiji Sun 2018) 
Following the swearing in of the 
newly elected coalition government in 
New Zealand in October 2017, the 
Niue premier met with the Deputy 
Prime Minister Winston Peters in early 
2018 to reaffirm Niue’s bilateral ties 
and present the Niue government’s 
position on its free association rela-
tionship with New Zealand (bcn, 1 
March 2018). Discussions included 
Niue’s preference for capital funds 
over the traditional monetary assis-
tance that New Zealand provides for 
local infrastructure and investment, as 
well as avenues for revenue generation 
for Niue in the long-term to develop 
economic self-sufficiency and sustain-
ability. 
In the same month, the New Zea-
land Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s 
Pacific Reset Tour, with her delegation 
of over fifty officials and guests, again 
saw the premier echoing similar lines, 
reaffirming his wishes for a change 
in the Niue-New Zealand relation-
ship and to substitute traditional aid 
for investment (bcn, 6 March 2018). 
The premier also used this oppor-
tunity to express Niue’s support for 
its eligibility for the New Zealand 
Superannuation and its portability to 
the realm countries, highlighting how 
New Zealand citizens living abroad in 
the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau 
should be eligible for it and question-
ing why it is that those in the realm 
countries are being treated differently. 
This highlights an area within Niue’s 
constitution and its relationship with 
New Zealand that warrants further 
exploration and clarification: To 
what extent does the free association 
relationship also extend the benefits 
enjoyed by citizens living in New Zea-
land to include those citizens who are 
living abroad in the realm countries?
The premier later announced Niue’s 
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withdrawal of support for the Social 
Assistance (Residency Qualification) 
Legislation Bill, citing that it would 
encourage young people to leave the 
island (rnz 2018b). Given the island’s 
youthful population, the potential 
passing of this bill will undoubtedly 
increase long-term pressure on Niue’s 
local services by adding extra pres-
sure to a health system that is already 
struggling to cope with looking after 
the island’s older population.
As a part of the Pacific Reset Tour, 
the New Zealand prime minister and 
her delegation pledged nz$750,000 
toward improving the island’s road 
and water infrastructure, and a nz$5 
million boost was injected into a 
project to help achieve Niue’s goal of 
 having 80 percent renewable energy 
by 2025 (Ardern 2018). This injec-
tion of funds from New Zealand 
will increase the island’s capacity to 
develop solar farms in a bid to become 
less reliant on fossil fuels. In addition 
to this, the Niue government received 
a new electric vehicle, which the pre-
mier has been trialing (bcn, 29 May 
2018). With the plan being to replace 
current vehicles used by cabinet 
ministers and some departments with 
electric vehicles, Niue has certainly got 
its eyes set on investing in more envi-
ronmentally friendly modes of trans-
port, including to roll these vehicles 
out to residents in the long run (bcn, 
29 May 2018). With an estimated 
cost of nz$20,000 per vehicle, this 
figure remains relatively out of reach 
for many. Despite still being just a 
concept—with explorations only into 
the viability of the government using 
electric cars—increasing fuel prices on 
the island may become an incentive 
for some to invest in more environ-
mentally friendly and cost-effective 
modes of transport.
While on the tour, Prime Minister 
Ardern also honored women in Niue, 
highlighting that the Niue Assembly 
has the highest number of women mps 
in any independent or self-governing 
country in the Pacific (bcn, 6 March 
2018).
Over the past decade, Niue’s inter-
national relations have grown. This 
small island has managed to garner 
support in the form of economic and 
development assistance from numer-
ous big players. Visits by ambassadors 
and high commissioners to New Zea-
land from various countries present-
ing their credentials occurred quite 
often throughout the 2017–2018 year. 
In September 2017, two consulate 
officials from the US Embassy in New 
Zealand carried out a scoping visit to 
Niue (bcn, 17 Sept 2017). With the 
aim of exploring development oppor-
tunities between the two countries, 
this visit was certainly a display of 
greater commitment by the United 
States for increasing its support of and 
activities within the Pacific region. 
Although Niue and the United States 
have no formal diplomatic relations, 
a courtesy visit by US Ambassador 
to New Zealand Scott Brown, who 
was appointed in June 2017 under 
the Trump administration, further 
highlighted the United States’ renewed 
interests in working with Pacific coun-
tries (bcn, 3 May 2018). The Turkish 
ambassador to New Zealand also pre-
sented his credentials during a cour-
tesy visit (bcn, 24 Oct 2017). Since 
Turkey established diplomatic ties 
with New Zealand in 2015, this was 
a milestone event as it was the first 
time a Turkish ambassador had visited 
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Niue. Italy’s ambassador to New Zea-
land also presented his credentials, as 
did the Australian high commissioner 
and the Indian high commissioner to 
New Zealand, further strengthening 
the bilateral ties. India has provided 
substantial development assistance to 
Niue, most notably with the provision 
of nz$1.2 million in funding toward 
upgrading the island’s mobile network 
from 2g to 4g (bcn, 26 Oct 2017). 
By the time of publication, the 4g 
network will have launched. To date, 
Niue has fifteen diplomatic relation-
ships, including with China, Singa-
pore, India, Australia, Cook Islands, 
Sāmoa, Thailand, Turkey, Cuba, 
Papua New Guinea, Kosovo, Japan, 
Italy, Brazil, and New Zealand, with 
which it has a constitutional relation-
ship (Niue High Commission 2018).
In December 2017, Niue and the 
People’s Republic of China celebrated 
ten years of diplomatic relations. A 
Chinese delegation of twelve visited 
the island to mark the occasion, with 
a formal ceremony followed by a 
large display of fireworks, described 
as the largest fireworks display ever 
seen on the island, held as celebrations 
to mark the milestone (bcn, 13 Dec 
2017). Signed under the leadership of 
former Premier Young Vivian, the cur-
rent Niue premier reiterated that Niue 
stands by its endorsement of the “One 
China” policy and supports ongoing 
cooperation between the two countries 
regarding economic and development 
assistance (bcn, 13 Dec 2017).
An economic and technical coop-
eration agreement with China was 
signed with the purpose of upgrading 
the island’s road infrastructure (bcn, 
13 Dec 2017). We continue to see big-
ger players in the international scene 
garnering support from smaller island 
nations such as Niue by providing 
economic and development assistance 
in exchange for support of their politi-
cal agendas. For instance, in exchange 
for economic assistance, Niue provides 
India support at international forum 
election processes and, as mentioned, 
Niue endorses China’s “One China” 
policy (bcn, 26 Oct 2017). With the 
United States now looking to increase 
its assistance to the island, it will 
be interesting to see how Niue will 
manage these relationships, compet-
ing interests, and the expectations of 
bigger countries of Niue, and how 
its relationship with its traditional 
aid and development partner, New 
Zealand, will continue going forward. 
Because support for the island’s devel-
opment has expanded, it has increased 
Niue’s ability to be more critical 
of the support that it receives from 
New Zealand.
Niue’s application to become a 
member of the Asian Development 
Bank (adb) has been marked with 
great progress. In recent months, the 
premier met with the president of 
the adb to discuss the viability and 
requirements for Niue’s member-
ship (Office of the Premier of Niue 
2018a). With a total membership of 
sixty-seven countries, the aim of the 
adb is to reduce poverty in the wider 
Asia Pacific region through “inclusive 
economic growth, environmentally 
sustainable growth, and regional 
integration” (bcn, 29 May 2018). In 
2017, it was reported that adb opera-
tions totaled just over us$30 billion, 
with us$11.9 billion in financing 
(bcn, 10 May 2018). The objectives 
of the organization align with Niue’s 
emphasis on economic and environ-
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mentally sustainable growth, although 
it would be worth exploring just how 
in-depth regional integration would 
be carried out, given the economic, 
developmental, social, and cultural 
differences among many of the Asian 
and Pacific Island nations.
Membership with the adb would 
expand Niue’s avenues for apply-
ing for financial support, in addi-
tion to working with its traditional 
development partners. This is the 
third time that Niue has applied for 
membership, and it is reported to be 
very close to meeting the required 
threshold for becoming a member, 
including garnering support from 
various member nations including 
India, the United States, and Indo-
nesia (Office of the Premier of Niue 
2018a). A us$100,000 membership 
fee is required to become a member 
(bcn, 3 May 2018). Consequently, it 
will be interesting to see just how Niue 
will make this payment, having to 
balance this against a budget deficit as 
well as government objectives to solve 
infrastructure issues, gain investments 
for future projects, and achieve other 
long-term goals.
Support from international agencies 
and organizations to the island has 
enabled an array of capacity-building 
projects focusing on economic and 
environmental sustainability. For 
instance, the Global Environment 
Facility along with the United Nations 
Development Project provided funding 
for the Accelerating Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency Applications 
in Niue (arean) project (bcn, 15 
Feb 2018). This project will spear-
head Niue’s vision to have 80 percent 
renewable electricity by 2025 and is 
set to be implemented in 2019. Niue’s 
first ever marine compliance strategy 
was compiled, in which consulta-
tions were held regarding the man-
agement of Niue’s marine resources 
(bcn, 15 Feb 2018). This strategy will 
help to put in place plans, rules, and 
regulations for the use of the island’s 
 maritime spaces.
Several other development initia-
tives were also undertaken, includ-
ing a mapping exercise of Niue’s 
civil society engagement, in a bid to 
 create a better understanding of local 
perspectives and the support required 
for grassroots projects, and so as to 
be better reflected in regional spaces 
and forums (bcn, 16 Nov 2017). Here 
we are seeing greater regional support 
for development and an increase in 
Pacific-led capacity building projects, 
highlighting the strength and commit-
ment of Niue to Pacific regionalism.
A vital observation made during 
the review period is that the current 
government appears to be exclusively 
influenced by a limited number of 
its members. Whether this is due to 
limitations of the constitution or the 
approach undertaken by the govern-
ment, it will be interesting to see how 
open and interactive with the popula-
tion it will become going forward. 
This calls for the Niue population to 
be more active in the democratic pro-
cess, be more aware and demanding of 
their local representatives, and to not 
be too complacent when it comes to 
politics. This observation reflects on 
the island’s political sophistication and 
the need for encouragement for the 
population to become more involved 
in decision-making processes.
This also calls for a review of the 
Niue Constitution, given that some of 
Niue’s legislations are very old; Niue 
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has changed and developed signifi-
cantly over the years since 1974. The 
language used in the constitution is 
very important and it is currently quite 
“loose,” requiring tightening as some 
articles may be interpreted in a variety 
of ways, giving room for amendments 
that may be questionable but not pro-
hibited by the constitution itself.
Overall, this review reflects Niue 
as a place that is still very much in 
the developing phases of its political 
existence, albeit with great potential. 
The premier’s preference for invest-
ments over “aid” is worth noting, as 
the use of such terms can influence 
donors’ and recipients’ perspectives on 
the amount of and attitudes toward 
support provided to Niue. This places 
Niue at an advantage over other devel-
oping nations, as its small size and 
relatively untouched nature enables 
it to carefully build its capacity to 
cater to its own needs and objectives 
by observing the experiences of other 
countries. It is hoped that Niue can 
manage all of the support it receives 
and its numerous relationships so as 
to effectively and efficiently achieve its 
long-term goals, including becoming 
more self-sufficient.
salote talagi
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Pitcairn
The islands of Pitcairn, Henderson, 
Ducie, and Oeno (commonly known 
as Pitcairn) make up a single territory, 
the last remaining United Kingdom 
Overseas Territory (ukot) in the 
Pacific Ocean. But much of the period 
under review (1 July 2017–30 June 
2018) was concerned with Pitcairn’s 
relationship with the European Union 
(EU), which has been highly advan-
tageous to the territory. However, a 
long shadow has been cast over these 
relations due to the upcoming depar-
ture of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union (Brexit), which was 
officially scheduled for 29 March 
2019.
Pitcairn is an Overseas Country 
and Territory (oct) of the Euro-
pean Union. octs are not part of the 
European Union and thus are not 
directly subject to EU law, but they 
do have associate status and thus 
receive various forms of assistance 
from Brussels. As a consequence, the 
limited resources of the Pitcairn Island 
Council were focused on securing as 
much EU funding as possible before 
Brexit, while also lobbying London 
to ensure the territory’s interests were 
safeguarded in the longer term.
A crucial meeting for Pitcairn 
was the European Union Overseas 
Countries and Territories Ministerial 
Conference held in Brussels between 
20 and 23 February 2018. A range 
of issues were discussed, including 
climate change, sustainable energy, 
and biodiversity, and what EU funding 
could best support initiatives in these 
areas (octa 2018). The highlight for 
Pitcairn was the signing of a European 
Development Fund (edf)–11 Focal 
Sector agreement, worth €2.35 mil-
lion (us$2.72 million), to upgrade the 
island’s medical center and to sup-
port several tourism-related activities, 
including “improving accessibility to 
Pitcairn, specifically by developing 
the Bounty Bay and Tedside landings 
and improving on-shore facilities” and 
“constructing a shelter and informa-
tion centre for tourists and other visi-
tors” (European Commission 2018a). 
A further €480,000 (us$556,000) 
was allocated under the EU’s Pacific 
Regional Funding to cover two-thirds 
of the preliminary budgeted cost of 
the introduction of solar-powered 
renewable energy to Pitcairn (Pitcairn 
Miscellany 2018b).
Because of the frequent time lag in 
getting EU funds disbursed, Pitcairn 
also benefitted from some edf-10 
money during the period under review. 
For example, a number of local road 
improvement projects were under-
taken through the European Union’s 
integre (Territories Initiative for 
Regional Management of the Envi-
ronment) program (Pitcairn Miscel-
lany 2017a). integre also supported 
a glass recycling project, whereby 
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empty glass bottles were recycled into 
souvenirs for the tourist market (Pit-
cairn Miscellany 2017b). The projects 
linked into integre’s focus on build-
ing resilience and sustainable develop-
ment in the Pacific octs in the face 
of climate change. In addition, funds 
from edf-10 paid for a new goods 
shed (Pitcairn Miscellany 2017a).
The importance of these funds was 
made clear in July 2017, when Pitcairn 
Islands Councillor Leslie Jaques gave 
evidence to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union on 
the likely impacts of Brexit. He noted 
that the European Union provides 
“a significant amount” of funding—
accounting for about 30 percent of 
Pitcairn’s overall budget (House of 
Lords 2017, 6). He also explained the 
importance of being part of a regional 
envelope of funding, which helps to 
facilitate cooperation with French 
Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and 
New Caledonia. Pitcairn gains benefits 
in other respects too; the European 
Union is one of Pitcairn’s largest 
markets for its honey exports, and the 
free movement of Pitcairners to French 
Polynesia, and particularly Tahiti, for 
medical treatment is crucial.
As a consequence, Pitcairn has 
much to lose from Brexit, and Jaques 
did not mince words during his time 
with the House of Lords committee. 
He said that the loss of EU funding 
and freedom of movement to other 
European Union territories would be 
“catastrophic”; he went on to say that 
“we trust in the [Brexit] process and 
we hope for the best” (House of Lords 
2017, 19). Jaques also cautioned that 
“we do not know [who will fill the 
funding gap], which is a concern” 
(House of Lords 2017, 6). So far the 
UK government has not given any 
reassurances that it will make good 
any shortfalls in support. More gener-
ally, there is still great uncertainty over 
what a post-Brexit relationship with 
the European Union will look like. 
And so, Pitcairn and the other over-
seas territories are largely beholden to 
trusting the UK government to make 
the best possible deal for them.
The view from the European 
Commission and the octs is rather 
mixed in terms of whether Pitcairn 
and the other UK territories will be 
able to maintain a relationship with 
them once the United Kingdom has 
withdrawn from the European Union. 
In its political declaration after the 
European Union Overseas Countries 
and Territories Ministerial Conference 
in February 2018, oct representa-
tives recommended that the Euro-
pean Union “explore how [the UK] 
octs can continue to benefit from 
preferential trade arrangements post 
Brexit” (octa 2018, 3). They also 
suggested that the United Kingdom 
could “contribute to the EU financial 
support earmarked for octs . . . with 
a view to maintain ukots within or 
alongside the octs grouping” (octa 
2018, 9). Overseas Countries and Ter-
ritories Association (octa) Chair and 
French Polynesia Vice President Teva 
Rohfritsch stated, “We will not turn 
our backs on our friends from Pitcairn 
Island because of Brexit. Regional 
co-operation will continue” (Pitcairn 
Miscellany 2018b).
The European Commission was 
more noncommittal, and in June 2018 
published a draft for a new “Council 
Decision on the Association of the 
Overseas Countries and Territories 
with the European Union,” which 
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specifically excludes the UK territo-
ries: “The proposed Decision will take 
into account the consequences of the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the fact 
that the special regime set out in Part 
Four of the tfeu [Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union] would 
no longer apply to the 12 British 
octs” (European Commission 2018b, 
9). So there are real concerns that, 
when (and if) a final Brexit deal is 
agreed to, the interests of Pitcairn and 
the other territories will be sidelined.
With the potential loss of support 
from the European Union, debate 
over Pitcairn’s long-term viability was 
placed into even sharper focus. The 
population remains at a near histori-
cally low level—in the mid-forties—
and it continues to age. Only seven 
people in paid employment are under 
the age of 50, and there are none in 
the 20–30 age group (UN 2018, 7). 
The new UK governor of Pitcairn, 
Laura Clarke, who assumed her post 
in January 2018, said the issue of 
the island’s future was “an existen-
tial question with no quick or easy 
answers” (Pitcairn Miscellany 2018c).
In an attempt to move this debate 
forward, several workshops on Pit-
cairn’s future were held during the 
period under review, although there 
were concerns that the younger mem-
bers of the community did not engage 
(pic 2018a, 2). Discussions included 
whether Pitcairners’ attitude toward 
migrants needed to improve; who 
should Pitcairn be targeting as pro-
spective migrants; and whether a more 
realistic marketing campaign—one 
which also highlighted the  difficulties 
of migrating to the territory—was 
needed. But there was also consider-
ation of whether a survey should be 
undertaken to see if current residents 
wanted to leave Pitcairn and what 
support they might require to resettle 
elsewhere (pic 2018c, 2; 2018d, 3). 
Nevertheless, there was frustration 
over the lack of concrete measures 
to start addressing Pitcairn’s perilous 
future. One Islander remarked “that 
we had spoken repeatedly on the same 
issues but nothing had happened to 
take things forward” (pic 2018d, 3).
Despite heightened concerns over 
the future of Pitcairn, several new 
initiatives were taken in an attempt to 
boost its economic viability.  Perhaps 
the most significant was the plan to 
designate Pitcairn as a Dark Sky Sanc-
tuary. To date only four locations in 
the world—Aotea/Great Barrier Island 
(New Zealand); Cosmic Campground 
(United States); Gabriela Mistral 
(Chile); and Rainbow Bridge National 
Monument (United States)—have 
this status. A Dark Sky Sanctuary is 
“public or private land that has an 
exceptional or distinguished quality of 
starry nights and a nocturnal environ-
ment that is protected for its scien-
tific, natural, or educational value, 
its cultural heritage and/or public 
enjoyment” (International Dark-Sky 
Association 2018). Pitcairn looked to 
the Aotea/Great Barrier Island in par-
ticular, which, after becoming a dark 
sky reserve in 2012, saw a significant 
growth in so-called astro-tourism. 
In February 2018, John Hearnshaw, 
emeritus astronomy professor from 
the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand, visited Pitcairn and indicated 
that the island met the criteria, and 
it was expected that an application 
would be made to the International 
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Dark-Sky Association later in the year 
(Pitcairn Miscellany 2018a).
However, the issue of Pitcairn’s 
inaccessibility, which would need 
addressing if “astro-tourism” was 
to become viable, was starkly high-
lighted when it was noted that in the 
six months prior to November 2017, 
there were no cruise ship arrivals, and 
even when Le Boreal did arrive the 
sea conditions were too rough to land 
the passengers (Pitcairn Miscellany 
2017c). As a result of these and other 
constraints, including the continued 
failure of the campaign to bring new 
(and younger) residents to Pitcairn, 
UK budgetary support—worth £3.1 
million (us$4 million) in fiscal year 
2018–19—remained crucial (dfid 
2018). This support was criticized by 
the Daily Mail, a widely read, right-
wing newspaper and long-term critic 
of the UK aid budget. An article by 
the paper’s deputy political editor, 
headlined “The paradise island that 
can’t persuade ANYONE to move 
there: UK gives Pitcairn £6.5m aid 
after drive to boost population fails,” 
mocked the failure of the recruitment 
campaign and quoted official docu-
ments from the Department of Inter-
national Development (dfid), stating 
that the aid was needed because the 
“able bodied population has declined 
to a critical level,” and that “the 
likelihood of a significant increase in 
population is low and the prognosis is 
very pessimistic” (Stevens 2018).
Another reason why it has proved 
so difficult to attract new residents is 
highlighted by the continuing effort 
to overcome Pitcairn’s legacy of past 
and more recent cases of child sexual 
abuse. A series of child safety meetings 
took place in August and early Sep-
tember 2017, and according to the UK 
government these enabled a successful 
reconciliation process to take place 
(UN 2018, 8). Then in November 
2017, two child safety reviewers con-
tracted by the United Kingdom visited 
Pitcairn “to undertake an independent 
review of [its child safety] systems and 
processes and overall culture of the 
island” (pic 2017b, 1). Pitcairn was 
still struggling to offer some form of 
public recognition of what had taken 
place. Also, one problem of manag-
ing the process of rehabilitation was 
highlighted when Pitcairn’s Internet 
connectivity was closed to other users 
in order to allow a recently released 
offender to hold Skype meetings with 
his psychologist (pic 2017a, 5).
Reports that Henderson Island 
had the highest density of man-made 
debris recorded anywhere in the 
world, weighing a combined total 
of 17.6 tonnes, elicited a response 
from Governor Clarke. Researchers 
from the University of Tasmania and 
the United Kingdom’s Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds made the 
discovery and suggested that about 
13,000 new items were washed up 
daily (The Guardian 2017). Gover-
nor Clarke highlighted the problem 
in her blog and announced that the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, with support 
from the Blue Belt Programme (a UK 
government initiative to help provide 
long-term protection for the marine 
environment) would send an expedi-
tion to Henderson to undertake a 
forensic analysis of the plastics to 
identify the sources of the litter and 
track the extent of the impact. There 
were also plans to clear a section of 
the beach, convert the plastic into a 
substitute for aggregate in concrete, 
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and add it into pathways and tour-
ist trails on Pitcairn (fco 2018). 
The expedition was initially planned 
for the latter half of 2018, but it 
was pushed back to early 2019 (pic 
2018b, 4).
Elections for the local council 
took place on 8 November 2017. 
The position of deputy mayor was 
uncontested, so Charlene Warren-Peu 
retained her position. The five council-
lors elected were Michele Christian, 
Darralyn Griffiths, Leslie Jaques, Sue 
O’Keefe, and Kevin Young (Pitcairn 
Miscellany 2017d).
So the year under review was one 
of uncertainty and continued vulner-
ability, particularly in relation to what 
will happen with Brexit. It is possible 
that the UK government will agree 
to a “softer” version, which would 
mean maintaining a relatively strong 
alignment with the European Union. 
And the closer the United Kingdom 
remains to the European Union, the 
better the outcome for Pitcairn. But 
there is no certainty of that and, as 
 Councillor Jaques warned, the impact 
of Brexit could be “catastrophic” 
if there is a significant breach. This 
threat comes at a time when Pitcairn 
(along with the UK government) 
remains unable to mitigate in any 
real way the  (long-standing) “exis-
tential”  problems facing the territory. 
The Dark Sky Sanctuary initiative 
is  certainly an interesting one, but 
without a  comprehensive, viable, 
and  sustainable plan for Pitcairn, the 
future is looking increasingly bleak. 
The  waste -management crisis on 
neighboring Henderson is perhaps 
indicative of this malaise: that the 
islands are too remote and the fund-
ing too small to maintain a viable and 
effective “British” presence on the 
islands.
peter clegg
References
dfid, Department for International 
Development. 2018. Development Tracker: 
Pitcairn Islands. https://devtracker.dfid.gov 
.uk/countries/PN [accessed 28 July 2018]
European Commission. 2018a. Pitcairn: 
Tourism Sector Reform Performance Con-
tract. Available from https://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/european-development-fund 
-programme-factsheets-pitcairn_en 
[accessed 28 June 2018]
———. 2018b. Proposal for a Coun-
cil Decision on the Association of the 
Overseas Countries and Territories with 
the European Union including relations 
between the European Union on the one 
hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom 
of Denmark on the other (“Overseas 
 Association Decision”). Brussels, 14 June. 
COM (2018) 461 final. Available from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better 
-regulation/initiatives/com-2018-461_en 
[accessed 28 June 2018]
fco, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
2018. Henderson Island: Plastic Pollution 
in Paradise. 10 April. https://blogs.fco.gov 
.uk/lauraclarke/2018/04/10/henderson 
-island-plastic-pollution-in-paradise/ 
[accessed 20 July 2018]
The Guardian. 2017. 38 Million Pieces  
of Plastic Waste Found on Uninhabited 
South Pacific Island. 15 May. https://www 
.theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/ 
15/38-million-pieces-of-plastic-waste 
-found-on-uninhabited-south-pacific-island 
[accessed 20 July 2018]
House of Lords. 2017. Corrected Oral 
—Evidence: Brexit: Overseas Territories. 
Select Committee on the European Union,  
10 July. http://data.parliament.uk/ 
224 the contemporary pacific • 31:1 (2019)
writtenevidence/committeeevidence 
.svc/evidencedocument/european-union 
-committee/brexit-overseas-territories/ 
oral/69288.pdf [accessed 12 June 2018]
International Dark-Sky Association. 2018. 
International Dark Sky Sanctuaries. http://
darksky.org/idsp/sanctuaries/ [accessed  
28 July 2018]
octa, Overseas Countries and Territories 
Association. 2018. 2017 octa Ministerial 
Conference, Political Declaration.  
Brussels, Belgium. 22 Feb. http://www 
.octassociation.org/IMG/pdf/-10.pdf 
[accessed 25 Aug 2018]
pic, Pitcairn Island Council. 2017a. 
 Minutes of the Council Meeting held at the 
Public Hall. 9 Aug. http://www.pitcairn.pn/ 
minutes/Approved%20Council%20 
Meeting%20Minutes%20Aug%209th 
%202017.pdf [accessed 20 July 2018]
———. 2017b. Public Meeting Notes: 
Community Consultation Meeting with 
Child Safety Reviewers Moyna Fletcher 
& Alan McGlade and Assistant Attorney 
General, Danielle Kelly. Held at the Public 
Hall. 19 Nov. http://www.pitcairn.pn/ 
minutes/Community%20Consultation 
%20Meeting%20Notes%20Nov%2019th 
%202017.pdf [accessed 20 July 2018]
———. 2018a. Minutes of the Special 
Council Meeting held at the Public Hall. 
14 Feb. http://www.pitcairn.pn/minutes/ 
Approved%20Council%20Meeting%20 
Minutes%20Feb%2014th%202018.pdf 
[accessed 20 July 2018]
———. 2018b. Minutes of the Special 
Council Meeting held at the Public Hall. 
18 April. http://www.pitcairn.pn/minutes/ 
Approved%20Council%20Meeting%20 
Minutes%20April%2018th.pdf [accessed 
20 July 2018]
———. 2018c. Minutes of the  Council 
Meeting held at the Public Hall. 9 May.  
http://www.pitcairn.pn/minutes/Approved 
%20Council%20Meeting%20Minutes 
%20May%209th%202018.pdf [accessed 
20 July 2018] 
———. 2018d. Minutes of the Special 
Public Meeting held at the Public Hall. 
25 May. http://www.pitcairn.pn/minutes/
Approved%20Council%20Special%20
Public%20Meeting%20Notes%20
May%2025th%202018.pdf [accessed  
20 July 2018]
Pitcairn Miscellany. 2017a. All in a Day’s 
Work. 60 (7 [ July]): 4. 
———. 2017b. Glass Re-cycling Project. 
60 (8 [Aug]): 5.
———. 2017c. Welcoming Sight as First 
Cruise Ship to Visit Pitcairn in 6 Months 
Arrives. 60 (11 [Nov]): 5.
———. 2017d. Elections for Council.  
60 (11 [Nov]): 9.
———. 2018a. Development of Astro 
Tourism on Pitcairn Gets the Go Ahead 
Light. 61 (3 [March]): 6.
———. 2018b. Pitcairn Councillor 
Attends Overseas Meetings in Europe. 
April: 4. 
———. 2018c. Governor (Community 
Member). 61 (4 [May]): 2.
Stevens, John. 2018. The Paradise Island 
that Can’t Persuade ANYONE to Move 
There: UK Gives Pitcairn £6.5m Aid after 
Drive to Boost Population Falls. Daily 
Mail, 12 Jan. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-5264809/Pitcairn-given-6-5m 
-aid-population-fails-boost.html [accessed 
29 June 2018]
UN, United Nations. 2018. Pitcairn: 
Working Paper prepared by the Secre-
tariat. Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
12 Feb. Available from http://www.un.org/
en/decolonization/workingpapers.shtml 
[accessed 5 Sept 2018]
political reviews • polynesia 225
Rapa Nui
Rapa Nui political events, issues, 
legislation, and social movements 
from 2017–2018 articulated across a 
complex spectrum of local, national, 
regional, and global scales that tran-
sected terrestrial as well as oceanic 
and discursive fields. Disputes over 
control of Rapa Nui cultural heritage, 
sacred places, and the ocean that 
occurred during the prior review 
period remained focal. Ley de Residen-
cia—the law for controlling Chilean 
and international migration to Rapa 
Nui, which was approved by Chile’s 
national legislature at the close of 
review last year—was officially imple-
mented in 2018 with the general sup-
port of Rapa Nui leadership. As the 
review year concluded, movement to 
change the official name for the island 
continued to gain support; however, 
the election of a new Chilean president 
forebodes a future that could radically 
differ from the broadly progressive 
present that Rapa Nui realized under 
the left-of-center administration led by 
President Michelle Bachelet.
Some of the breadth of island 
politics were visible during a visit to 
the island in September 2017, where 
I participated in a locally organized 
international seminar entitled “Dia-
logues Sobre Derechos Humanos 
Desde La Perspectiva Del Pueblo 
Mā‘ori Rapa Nui” (Dialogues on 
Human Rights from the perspec-
tive of the Mā‘ori Rapa Nui people), 
held at the Toŋariki Cultural Center 
in Haŋa Roa. The seminar included 
approximately thirty speakers and 
was organized by the Rapa Nui–
determined organization Honui (an 
assembly of “family clan” (hua‘ai) 
leaders), the Council of Elders, and 
the Parlamento Rapa Nui along with 
the support of the Municipality of 
Easter Island and the International 
Working Group on Indigenous 
Affairs (iwgia) (Sandoval 2017). 
Speakers included representatives 
of Indigenous peoples of the Basque 
territory of Europe, Bolivia, Chile, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, 
and Tahiti; scholars with expertise on 
self-determination in Cook Islands, 
globalization, and Indigenous rights 
in Mexico; Rapa Nui representatives; 
attorneys for Rapa Nui people in 
state and international arenas; and 
anthropologists of Rapa Nui, includ-
ing myself and Grant McCall.
The seminar participants’ peaceful 
dialogue was contrasted by the signs 
encircling the cultural center, which 
traced an island world entangled in 
a “battle order” (Foucault 1980, 
16). Outside, the offices of the gov-
ernor were covered in banners and 
flags coded in Spanish, Rapa Nui, 
and  English that condemned the 
 Chilean government as an “usapa-
dor” (usurper) conducting “consultas 
ilegalas” (illegal consultations). 
Signs also demanded that “their own 
people” and not the “Government 
of Chile decide for us.” Up the road, 
large banners and black flags deni-
grated the front gate of the five-star 
hotel Hangaroa Eco-Village and Spa 
with slogans like “Hanga Roba Hotel 
Pirata” coupled with graphic images 
of guns paired with skull and cross-
bones and statements that the hotel 
was “built on stolen land.” Inside 
the seminar venue, Nancy Yáñez, 
the leading attorney for Honui and a 
descendant of the Indigenous Mapu-
che people of Chile, emphasized that 
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self-determination for Rapa Nui was 
supported by the “founding prin-
ciples of the United Nations,” which 
require all member state governments 
to provide “tools for people to freely 
define their political status” (Sandoval 
2017). Attorney Ciro Colombara—
who is currently representing Parla-
mento Rapa Nui and the Council of 
Elders in an  ongoing legal case filed 
against the Chilean state in 2015 at 
the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (iachr) within the Organiza-
tion of American States (Economía y 
Negocios, 15 Nov 2015)—advised the 
Rapa Nui people that “the outcome 
of the lawsuit” will be fundamental to 
the “path” that they should organize 
for self-determination in the coming 
years (Sandoval 2017). An outcome 
statement of the seminar asserted that 
Rapa Nui people consider any “state 
title” or “concession” regulating their 
ancestral territory as an unacceptable 
“limitation of the territorial rights of 
the Rapa Nui people,” and that they 
aspire to “have full ownership rights 
over their lands and territories” based 
on “ancestral occupation” that is 
“regulated by customary law.” The 
outcome statement and the voices of 
participants from within the semi-
nar, as well as the symbolic banners 
outside, constitute useful regimes of 
 “veridiction and jurisdiction” for 
assessing the indigenous politics of 
the review period (Foucault 1991, 
79); that is, what should politically be 
known (verdiction) and done (jurisdic-
tion) in the island world.
Following the seminar in Sep-
tember, global media attention to 
the Rapa Nui case at the iachr was 
notably linked to the Catalunya 
independence movement from Spain 
(Anarte 2017). Yet as the review 
period closes, there are no new reports 
 regarding the case since the register-
ing of testimony by Matías Riroroko, 
given during a commission hearing in 
March 2017 that denounced histori-
cal and  contemporary “use of vio-
lence and police repression” by Chile 
(Organization of American States 
2017). Erity Teave, vice president of 
Parlamento Rapa Nui, emphasized 
that the case regards the restoration of 
the rights of Rapa Nui people to “the 
collective property of its territory,” 
which the state of Chile undermined 
as it colonized the island beginning 
in the late nineteenth century, doing 
so in violation of the 1888 bilateral 
treaty known as the “Agreement of 
Wills” (Acuerdo de Voluntades) signed 
by Rapa Nui and Chilean representa-
tives (El Ciudadano, 25 Sept 2017). 
José Rapu, an elected commissioner of 
the Island Development Commission 
(codeipa), saw the state delays with 
the iachr as  reflective of a history 
of state “paternalism and colonial-
ism” that fails to build the capacity 
of the Rapa Nui people “to develop” 
on their own terms and to truly solve 
“the problems of the island” (Bertin 
2017). While the state assured the 
commission of its “willingness to 
engage in dialogue” (Organization 
of  American States 2017), Chile was 
noted as not responding within the 
period requested by the court (Valle-
jos 2017). Irrespective of the delays, 
attorney Colombara insisted he had 
“no doubt about the legal soundness 
of the case” and its consistency with 
the history of “the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights” that has “recognized the col-
lective property rights of indigenous 
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peoples over their territories” (Bertin 
2017).
As the seminar concluded on 9 
September 2017, a date that marked 
the anniversary of the 1888 initia-
tion of Chilean colonization in Rapa 
Nui, the Chilean state announced 
the official designation of a Marine 
Protected Area (mpa) of multiple uses 
around Rapa Nui. Pew Charitable 
Trusts commended the declaration and 
highlighted its own role in the “edu-
cation and training” that helped to 
facilitate the process (Pew Charitable 
Trusts 2017). The declaration fol-
lowed a series of public consultations 
that began in July (Gobernación Isla 
de Pascua, 13 July 2017), continu-
ing until a vote on 28–29 August that 
was later tabulated as resulting in a 
62 percent approval of coadministra-
tion of the mpa (Gobernación Isla de 
Pascua, 4 Sept 2017). Coadministra-
tion is supposed to include elected 
representatives of the Rapa Nui people 
within codeipa and of island fishing 
organizations; both had previously 
been excluded in the 2015 presiden-
tial proposal for the mpa and conse-
quently denounced the proposal, as 
well as its coordination with Pew, as 
colonial (Young 2018, 198–202). 
Though a positive step for Rapa 
Nui working within Chilean regimes 
of veridiction and jurisdiction in com-
parison to the 2015 proposal, island 
communication within and outside of 
the September 2017 seminar resonated 
significant public dissonance regarding 
the declaration. Next to the afore-
mentioned banners surrounding the 
governor’s office, signs also declared 
“Pew—Go Home!” and commanded 
“No Parque Marino! Haka rē te 
vaikava o te Rapa Nui!” (No Marine 
Park! Leave the ocean of the Rapa Nui 
people alone!). Inside the seminar, a 
leading elder fisherman gave a speech 
contesting the July and August consul-
tations, stressing that the final plebi-
scite amounted to a set of “papers” 
(parau) “for taking” (me‘e toke) “the 
ocean” (te vaikava) of the Rapa Nui 
people. His critique accorded with an 
18 July letter to President Bachelet 
signed by the leading representatives 
of Honui, a copy of which I obtained 
as a seminar participant. The letter 
characterized the entire consultation 
processes as not only “illegal”—given 
that it did not work within interna-
tional frameworks of self-determina-
tion—but also as a tool of “assimila-
tion” and potential “genocide.” The 
local environmental nongovernmental 
organization Kakaka Ecological Here 
Henu‘a Mā‘ori Rapa Nui and the 
women’s group Movimiento Komari 
also registered public criticism of the 
designation. They historically contex-
tualized it as extending state “viola-
tion” of the 1888 Agreement of Wills, 
which they anticipate will be “detri-
mental to current and future genera-
tions.” They think that the purported 
goal of the mpa to help conserve 
world diversity is a “false premise” 
that conceals its entanglement in the 
production of benefits for “external 
systems alien to our ancestral culture” 
(El Ciudadano, 31 Aug 2017). 
Rapa Nui alarm is substantiated 
by a diversity of global concerns with 
mpas. Though mpas worldwide are 
promoted in mass media as tools of 
ocean conservation, they are ulti-
mately embedded in the goliath World 
Bank project of a “blue economy” 
that values the ocean in the trillions 
of US dollars (World Bank 2018). 
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This regime of capital accumulation 
monetizes the ocean for aquaculture, 
blue-carbon trading, industrial fisher-
ies, and seabed mining (Campbell and 
others 2016, 518–528), which local 
and indigenous peoples worldwide 
have experienced as a form of “ocean 
grabbing” that jeopardizes their 
 livelihood (Pedersen and others 2014). 
As a regime of marine governance 
that helps standardize their access to 
and control over “blue resources” 
(Barbasgaard 2018, 145), “powerful 
actors” like rent-seeking state officials, 
large-scale international conservation 
organizations, big tourist companies, 
and state treasuries promote mpa-
style conservation (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson 2012, 337); however, the 
“scientific basis” underlying mpas 
is questioned (Campbell and oth-
ers 2016, 535–536), and the overall 
capacity of blue economy projects to 
restore and sustain “ocean health” is 
unknown (Barbasgaard 2018, 145).
Chilean interest in increased regula-
tion of the ocean may thus be read in 
accord with its broader history of neo-
liberal environmental agendas. While 
green policies often emerged in states 
in the 1960s and 1970s in response to 
internal social organization of citizens 
motivated by a “concern for health 
and ecological conditions,” in Chile 
such policies were formed by external 
concerns with “trade and investment,” 
especially in relation to satisfying the 
conditions of participation in global 
trade associations, like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(nafta) (Tecklin, Bauer, and Prieto 
2011, 884–886). Chile has imple-
mented neoliberal environmental poli-
cies throughout the south of the state 
that dispossess Indigenous Mapuche 
people while selling and leasing 
terri tory to “green grabbing” billion-
aires privatizing nature for a variety 
of interests (Holmes 2014). Amid 
announced proposals of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (tpp) megaprojects like an 
underwater fiber-optic cable linking 
China and Chile through the ocean of 
Rapa Nui (Young 2018, 201), the mpa 
could indeed be an oceanic exten-
sion of Chile’s neoliberal “market-
enabling” policies for the environment 
(Tecklin, Bauer, and Prieto 2011, 
882–884). Development projects have 
been known to be implemented for 
their “side-effects” (Ferguson with 
Lohman 2016, 192–193). Since Chile 
implemented environmental policy on 
the continent in the context of nafta, 
and as China has intensified its politi-
cal economic investments in Oceania 
(Wesley-Smith 2013), the mpa could 
ultimately prove to be less about the 
conservation of marine life and more 
about establishing the environmental 
conditions that would enable Chile 
to catch big Chinese fish in the World 
Bank sea of blue economic growth. 
Indigenous politics of Chinese capital 
in Cook Islands (Webb 2016, 54–55) 
and Chile (Aylwin, Silva, and Vargas 
2018, 220) continue to be on the 
horizon for Rapa Nui. Although the 
mpa designation would be seemingly 
designed to protect the island from 
megaprojects, as the review period 
ended, public discussion of the fiber-
optic cable development continued 
with state authorities.
On 23 November 2017, President 
Bachelet signed a decree on the hal-
lowed grounds of Ahu Toŋariki, estab-
lishing full indigenous administration 
of the Chilean National Park (Rapa 
Nui National Park) on the island. The 
political reviews • polynesia 229
change marks the end of a colonial 
state policy that began in 1935 that 
territorialized Rapa Nui “sacred 
places” (vahi tapu) and “ancestral 
valuables” (hauha‘a tupuna) within 
the park—a policy created without 
the consultation of the Indigenous 
people (Teave and Cloud 2014, 410). 
Full administration emerged after 
two years of struggle against man-
dated coadministration implemented 
through state force (Young 2017), 
which followed indigenous reclama-
tion of the territory and heritage in 
March 2015 led by Parlamento Rapa 
Nui (Young 2016a). Full administra-
tion is based on a fifty-year “conces-
sion” of state management to the 
indigenous community organization 
known as Ma‘u Henua (Gobernación 
de Isla de Pascua, 23 Nov 2017). 
While the concession is conceived as 
an important step toward self-determi-
nation by Rapa Nui people generally, 
like the mpa, it was opposed by key 
leaders and indigenous institutions. 
Honui representatives protested the 
concession in letters to UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz 
as well as the iachr. Concession is 
seen in the letters to undermine Rapa 
Nui claims to “territorial rights” 
that would reestablish the collective 
indigenous “ownership” of the land 
(El Ciudadano, 18 Nov 2017). In 
August 2018 interviews, Erity Teave 
described the concession as a “slap 
in the face,” reflecting a history of 
state strategy of attempting to avoid 
comprehensive conflict resolution with 
Rapa Nui by offering them “huŋa 
huŋa” (crumbs). Island Mayor Petero 
Edmunds also contested the conces-
sion and refused to participate in the 
Toŋariki ceremony (El Ciudadano, 
18 Nov 2017). While appreciative of 
progression from coadministration to 
full, Rapa Nui denouncing the conces-
sion contest the legitimacy of the state 
authority to cede land to Rapa Nui 
in terms similar to the ways  families 
have disputed state authority to grant 
“titulo dominio” (land titles) to island 
territory. Rapa Nui leaders have 
long maintained that the state can-
not coherently give titles to territory 
because they deny the state has any 
titles to give. Many Rapa Nui people 
conceive their entitlement to land as 
not constituted “from the Chilean 
government” but through “genealogy 
traced to Hotu Matu‘a,” the founding 
Rapa Nui chief of the island (Young 
2016c, 140).
The politics of Rapa Nui control 
of hauha‘a tupuna were not limited 
to the island itself during the year 
under review. On 27 January 2018, 
New Zealand’s Canterbury Museum, 
the Museum of New Zealand Te 
Papa Tongarewa, and the Otago 
Museum returned “ancestral bones” 
(ivi tupuna) to the Rapa Nui people—
the first international repatriation to 
Rapa Nui in history (El Programa 
de Repatriación Rapa Nui, 1 Feb 
2018). The repatriation included 
two skulls and was organized by El 
Programa de Repatriación Rapa Nui: 
Ka Haka Hoki Mai Te Mana Tupuna, 
a grassroots organization created by 
Indigenous leader Piru Huke Atan 
and  fellow Rapa Nui cultural leaders 
in 2013 with leading coordination 
by Jacinta Arthur and Mario Tuki. 
El Programa de Repatriación Rapa 
Nui is the first repatriation program 
created in Chile and has received 
recognition from the National Monu-
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ments Council (Arthur 2019). The 
ivi tupuna were returned following 
a departure ceremony at the ceremo-
nial Marae Tuahiwi, followed by a 
welcoming  ceremony at the Mataveri 
International Airport in Rapa Nui; 
they are to be held temporarily at 
the Father Sebastian Englert Anthro-
pological Museum until community 
dialogue with the state establishes a 
protocol for their final reburial. Piru 
Huke emphasized that she and her 
fellow “children of Hotu Matu‘a” are 
“deeply grateful” to the Māori “for 
returning their tupuna” to their land 
(El Programa de Repatriación Rapa 
Nui, 1 Feb 2018). The process of 
repatriation was a political struggle. 
Despite initial recognition of El Pro-
grama de Repatriación Rapa Nui, the 
Chilean National Monuments Council 
opposed many of their efforts in terms 
of an agenda of “neoliberal multicul-
turalism” that manages cultural and 
biological heritage as state patrimony 
valued for scientific study rather than 
“ontological restoration” of indig-
enous peoples (Arthur 2019).
Ley de Residencia was implemented 
1 August 2018, following its March 
2018 publication in the state govern-
ment gazette as Ley 21,070 (Gober-
nación Isla de Pascua, 23 March 
2018). The official purpose of the 
law is to “regulate the exercise of the 
rights to reside, stay and move to and 
from the special territory of Easter 
Island” (Colegio Abagados 2018). 
According to article 5, “Any person, 
Chilean or foreign, who enters Easter 
Island, may remain in the special ter-
ritory for a maximum period of thirty 
days”; qualifications of residency 
terms are detailed further in the con-
text of sixty-two articles, but the key 
change is that prior to this law a Chil-
ean national could continue to stay 
in Rapa Nui beyond a visit for tour-
ism (Colegio Abagados 2018). The 
codeipa commissioners of Rapa Nui 
publicly voiced general approval of 
the law, though Commissioner Zoilo 
Huke acknowledged “it is not per-
fect,” and Commissioner José Rapu 
noted that it did not achieve “what 
we aspired to in its entirety.” Com-
missioner Poki Tane Haoa highlighted 
it as promoting the “common good,” 
and Commissioner Anakena Manu-
tomatoma described it as establishing 
an important step for “ordering” and 
“caring” for our territory “sustain-
ably.” In a context where uncontrolled 
migration was perceived as resulting 
in problems with managing energy, 
pollution, waste, and water as well as 
loss of “respect for traditions,” Com-
missioner Irene Haoa considered the 
law a valuable “tool of protection” 
that could help Rapa Nui “return to 
live with umaŋa” (Gobernación Isla 
de Pascua, 23 March 2018); that is, a 
way of life of solidarity. Parlamento 
Rapa Nui Vice-President Erity Teave, 
in interviews with me, also  supported 
the law; she hoped, however, that 
some of the content of the first articles 
would be refined and become more 
restrictive. In the current version, a 
settler with a residency on the island 
can authorize island migration of 
their extended family; many Rapa 
Nui would like that to be limited to 
nuclear family only.
As the review period came to a 
close, changes in Chilean national 
politics suggested that some of the 
political progress achieved by Rapa 
Nui under President Bachelet, irrespec-
tive of its limitations, could come to 
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a screeching halt. Sebastian Piñera, 
“Chile’s Donald Trump” (Arostegui 
2018), was reelected president of 
Chile under the right-wing Reno-
vación Nacional party during Novem-
ber and December 2017, officially 
replacing President Bachelet on 11 
March 2018. On assuming office, 
he activated a cabinet that included 
officials historically supportive of 
infamous dictator Pinochet as well 
as the Colonia  Dignidad organiza-
tion of German Chileans used by 
Pinochet to torture and murder 
opponents of his regime (The Guard-
ian, 23 Jan 2018).  Leviante Araki, 
president of Parlamento Rapa Nui, 
 encouraged “all Chileans” to not vote 
for Piñera (Biobio, 27 June 2017). He 
denounced the candidacy of Piñera 
in terms of his prior record of human 
rights violations against Indigenous 
peoples of Chile generally, and par-
ticularly in Rapa Nui where Piñera is 
held responsible for the violence that 
state special forces known as “Gope” 
inflicted upon Rapa Nui during the 
2010 political conflicts (cnn Chile, 27 
June 2017). State brutality led to the 
successful granting of precautionary 
measures against Chile at the iachr, 
investigations by the United Nations, 
condemnations on the US Congres-
sional floor, and detailed articula-
tions of state violation of the United 
Nations Declaration of the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples by the iwgia 
(Young 2016b, 264–266). Piñera’s 
initial actions against Indigenous 
peoples during his second presidency 
suggest his new administration is 
capable of imposing further oppres-
sion of the Rapa Nui island world. 
In June, he announced the expansion 
of his Gope team of special forces, 
now empowered by new weapons 
and “armored vehicles,” trained to 
fight “terrorism” by military forces 
“of the United States and Colom-
bia” that the state intends to use to 
combat the Indigenous Mapuche 
people of Southern Chile (Santiago 
Times, 29 June 2018). Disturbingly, 
these actions follow increased use of 
the State Terrorist Act to criminalize 
Indigenous peoples of Chile in 2017 
(Aylwin, Silva, and Vargas 2018), an 
act that originated under Pinochet to 
criminalize leftist opposition (Richards 
2013, 103) and began to be applied 
to Indigenous peoples in Chile during 
the 1990s under the administration 
of Patricio Aylwin in conflicts with 
Mapuche (Carruthers and Rodriguez 
2009, 749). Today, it is criticized as 
violating international “due process 
guarantees” (Amnesty International 
2018) and broadening the scope of 
terrorism so as to criminalize cases of 
indigenous land and property conflict 
beyond standard definitions of the 
term (Richards 2010, 73–76). Mapu-
che incarcerated by the act identify 
themselves as “political prisoners” 
(Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009, 
749). In 2017, experts to the Office 
of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (ohchr) 
“urged” Chile to stop prosecuting its 
indigenous peoples under antiterror-
ism legislation (ohchr 2017), which 
consequently came under official 
review by the United Nations Com-
mittee Against Torture the following 
year (El Mostrador, 14 Aug 2018).
From 2017–2018, as in the rep-
resentation of the 2010–2011 indig-
enous political occupations and 
consequent state violence, there are 
competing discourses for “placing” 
232 the contemporary pacific • 31:1 (2019)
the Rapa Nui world and ascrib-
ing meaning to the “various things, 
people, histories, and events” (Young 
2012, 2–3). Within the discourse 
of Chilean law, this year Rapa Nui 
people significantly destabilized forces 
and institutions that have long mar-
ginalized and manipulated their sub-
ject position in favor of networks of 
tourist, state, and scientific actors. In 
addition to strengthening control over 
their cultural heritage and demogra-
phy, as well as marine and terrestrial 
resources, as the period concluded 
Rapa Nui appear to be gaining control 
of the nomenclature that has defined 
them in terms of “history begin-
ning with the arrival of Europeans” 
(Hau‘ofa 2008, 62). Camilo Rapu, 
president of Ma‘u Henua, lauded the 
progress of the state parliamentary 
processes initiating a formal change of 
the island name from “Easter Island” 
(Isla de Pascua) to Rapa Nui. For 
Rapu, the toponym “Easter Island” is 
the “inheritance of the slaveholder” 
world of colonial history (Adprensa, 
8 July 2018). Rapu, like many others, 
hoped to empower instead the name 
“Rapa Nui”—one that honors their 
“cultural heritage” and authority to 
name themselves (Adprensa, 8 July 
2018). While remaining entangled 
in a concession, mpa, and migration 
laws that foreclose a comprehensive 
form of self-determination—which 
Rapa Nui continue to pursue through 
the iachr and United Nations—it 
would be mistaken to think that 
Rapa Nui regimes of veridiction and 
jurisdiction have failed to progress. 
Significant  discursive, legal, oceanic, 
and terrestrial steps that have started 
to close the settler colonial world of 
“Easter Island” are opening Rapa Nui 
upon alternative paths of indigenous 
 creation. 
forrest wade young
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